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Abstract
Currently, problem gambling is classified as an impulse control disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Greater understanding of problem gambling’s 
underlying pathologies is needed. The present study is an attempt to elucidate motor and 
cognitive disinhibition in problem gambling by applying two theoretical approaches 
researched with other “impulsive” groups. These theoretical approaches are the passive- 
avoidance learning paradigm (e.g., Newman 1987), derived mostly from the study of 
psychopaths, and the stop-signal paradigm (Logan & Cowan, 1984), which comes from 
the study of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
The study compares 30 problem gamblers (PGs) to 37 controls (CTRLs) on two 
computer tasks of the above paradigms. Results on the stop-signal task show that PGs are 
slower in stopping their responses than CTRLs (p = 0.06, two-tailed), with no difference 
between the groups in ‘go’ reaction times. On the passive-avoidance task, a medium 
effect size (Cohen’s d=  0.37) suggests that PGs are more likely to make passive- 
avoidance errors, and thus to exhibit learning deficits, than CTRLs when faced with both 
reward and punishment.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Ron Frisch, Dr. Doug Shore, Dr. 
Rosemary Cassano, and Dr. David Hodgins for their helpful comments throughout this 
process. I am especially grateful to Dr. Stephen Hibbard, dissertation supervisor and 
shrink extraordinaire, without whom I would not have finished this project.
To the Psychology Department at the University, faculty, staff, and students, thank you 
for the education, the drama, and the fun. I have to give a very special thank you to Ms. 
Barb Zakoor for never deleting my countless e-mails after I forgot to register/pay fees/ 
fill out forms/etc. Without your organizational skills and patience, I would have been an 
even bigger mess than I already am.
Thank you to the Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre which partially funded my 
research (Doctoral Research Fellowship).
I am indebted to my colleagues, Dr. Jeff Abracen, Dr. Janice Picheca, and Dr. Tania 
Stirpe, for the bottomless lattes, the anxiety-reducing shopping binges, and the countless 
hours of support -  thank you for keeping me on the right side of the bars!
Finally, I am grateful to my family: to my parents, for always supporting my education 
even when others didn’t; to Sigmund, Anna and Oliver whose little tummies always woke 
me up in the morning even when I wanted to sleep in; and to my brother, the original Dr. 
Chopra -  you’ve been striving to break topsoil since day one (which you’ve definitely 
soared beyond!) and you’ve always helped me strive for higher too.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.




LIST OF TABLES vii
LIST OF FIGURES viii
LIST OF APPENDICES ix
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 3
Problem Gambling 3
Pathways to Problem Gambling 6
Biological Research in Problem Gambling 9
Psychological Research in Problem Gambling 11
Impulsivity and Disinhibition 12
Passive-avoidance learning paradigm 15
Stop-signal paradigm 26
Disinhibition and Gambling 31
Limitations of Previous Research 33
Present Study and Hypotheses 35
III. METHODOLOGY 37
Participants 37
Tests and Materials 42
Canadian Problem Gambling Index 42
Stop-signal Task (computer-based task) 45





Analysis 1: T h e‘stopping’ process 54
Analysis 2: The ‘go’ process 60
Analysis 3: Passive-avoidance paradigm 61
V. DISCUSSION 67
Clinical Implications 72
Limitations and Future Research 75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling
APPENDIX A: Written instructions for Stop-signal task (computer-
based task) 78
APPENDIX B: Written instructions for Passive-avoidance task
(computer-based task) 79
APPENDIX C: Mechanisms of Impulsivity Telephone Screen 80
APPENDIX D: Consent Form 87
APPENDIX E: Full List of Measures in Disinhibition Study 89
REFERENCES 93
VITA AUCTORIS 105
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling
List of Tables
Table 1: Summary of Psychobiological Model of Personality 18
Table 2: Independent T-tests for Time and Money Spent Gambling in
past 12 Months 52
Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Stopping
Times (S SRT0bs) 5 8
Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes across Type of
Trial and Consequence 63
Table 5: Mixed Repeated Measures ANOVA for Group by Error Type by
Consequence -  Main effects and Interactions 65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling
List of Figures
Figure 1: Four-stage Response Modulation 21
Figure 2: Race Model of the Stop-Signal Paradigm 28
Figure 3: Mean Stopping Time (SSRT0bs) across Blocks 57
Figure 4: Stop-signal Errors by Sound Delay 59
Figure 5: Number of Commission and Omission Errors by Task 64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling
List of Appendices
APPENDIX A: Written instructions for Stop-signal task 78
APPENDIX B: Written instructions for Passive-avoidance task 79
APPENDIX C: Mechanisms of Impulsivity Telephone Screen 80
APPENDIX D: Consent Form 87
APPENDIX E: Full List of Measures in Disinhibition Study 89
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling 1
Passive-avoidance learning and response inhibition in problem gamblers
Introduction
Although a seemingly uncomplicated question, the ‘why?’ of human behaviour 
has been of interest from the inception of psychology as a discipline. Learning theory has 
proposed the notion that, broadly speaking, rewarding1 behaviour tends to cause the 
behaviour to repeat, but punishing it has the opposite effect (e.g., Brogden, Lipman, & 
Culler, 1938; Levis, 1989; McAllister & McAllister, 1991; Mowrer & Lamoreaux, 1942). 
More recently, a number of researchers have also broached the role of human personality, 
its various characteristics, and its relation to human actions. For example, a study by 
O’Gorman and Baxter (2002) looked at the relationship between personality variables 
such as conscientiousness and self-control to imprudent behaviours or criminal intent. 
They defined conscientiousness based on the scale of the same name of the NEO-PI-R 
(Costa & McCrae, 1989). This scale, comprised of a number of personality variables 
(e.g., dutifulness, self-discipline, and deliberation) is conceptually similar to the idea of 
self-control, or the ability to act (or withhold an action) based on thoughts of short-term 
and long-term consequences for oneself and others (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).
O’Gorman and Baxter (2002) determined that self-control relates to whether or 
not an opportunity for behaviour holds excitement, rather than to the possibility of 
punishment. In other words, if a subject does not take part in imprudent or criminal 
behaviour, it is because that act is deemed unexciting or unattractive. Therefore, the 
possibility of punishment did not stop the subject from participating. Following this line
1 Depending upon the precise learning theory in question “positive reinforcement” might be a more proper 
substitution for “reward”. The contemporary theories underlying this study (i.e., Gray, 1985, 1991) can 
accommodate this.
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of research, a number of different attempts have tried to explain many aspects of human 
behaviour. Of particular interest are those efforts focused on the concept of impulsivity 
and, more specifically, impulsivity and its relation to problem gambling.
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Review of the Literature
Problem Gambling
Problem gambling would benefit from greater understanding of its underlying 
pathologies. With respect to a definition of gambling, Bergler (1957) states that there is 
general consensus over the core elements of what forms the context for gambling to 
occur. This includes: an agreement between at least two parties in which there is an 
exchange of items of value on the basis of the outcome of an undecided event; 
participation is voluntary; and, the participants are motivated to wager valuable items in 
the hopes of gaining profit and/or generating a subjective arousal. Notably, these 
elements do not have inherent moral, social, or religious value. Problem gambling, then, 
would be gambling behaviours taken to an extreme, resulting in excessively negative 
financial, social, and psychological consequences.
Archaeological evidence suggests that gambling is a ubiquitous pastime, and 
exists in almost every race and culture since 4000 B.C. (Blaszczynski, 1996). Even so, 
there is much to be learned from its development and history. While gambling itself is not 
inherently a social problem, social conventions have placed limits around what is 
acceptable and what is not. Problems arise when the consequences of excessive gambling 
require some mode of intervention to prevent or avoid further harm or side effects (i.e., 
financial strain, criminality, marital problems).
As Blaszczynski (1996) details, both competitive gambling and loss of control 
have long been correlated with social costs. For example, in his historical review of 
gambling, Blaszczynski (1996) recounts the story of a 1500 B.C. Indus River tribesman 
who gambled so heavily he lost 200 000 slaves, his kingdom, his brother, and his wife. In
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more recent history, by 1822, the majority of European nations had some laws 
prohibiting gambling, which closely preceded similar laws in America. These laws 
followed an increase in problems with respect to family welfare, public safety, and 
juvenile delinquency.
Unfortunately, the current state of affairs does not appear to be much brighter. 
Some have suggested that any attempts to contain or limit gambling are destined to fail 
for three basic reasons: gambling continues to hold the prospect for fast easy money; 
excitement and entertainment are inherent to the activity; and gambling represents a 
lucrative, and therefore, attractive, source of revenue for governments and entrepreneurs 
alike (Blaszczynski, 1996).
Similar to the historical account, problem gambling is associated with many 
present day social issues: substance abuse, suicide, divorce, bankruptcy, and legal 
problems (Lesieur & Rosenthal, 1991). Early estimates of Canadian prevalence rates for 
problem gambling approach 2% in different areas of the country (Ladouceur, 1996; 
Shaffer, Hall, & Vander Bilt, 1999). A recent national survey of Canadian gambling 
(Cox, Yu, Afifi, & Ladouceur, 2005) compares prevalence rates across the provinces. 
Using the Canadian Problem Gambling Index on a sample of 34 770 community-based 
respondents aged 15 years or older, results show that Manitoba (2.9%) and Saskatchewan 
(2.9%) have the highest prevalence of gambling problems (moderate and severe), 
followed by Alberta (2.2%), Nova Scotia and Ontario (2%), Newfoundland, Prince 
Edward Island, and British Columbia (1.9%), Quebec (1.7%), and New Brunswick 
(1.5%). The highest prevalence is in areas with high concentrations of community based 
video lottery terminals and permanent casinos.
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In addition to this existing scenario, Wynne (2002) has forecasted trends in 
Canadian gambling:
1) Gambling will continue to expand, and machine-based gambling such as 
video lottery terminals (VLT), coin slots, electronic Keno and bingo, and 
video poker will become the most pervasive form of gambling.
2) As people become increasingly high-tech, with more personal home 
computers, the future of gambling will include legalized Internet gambling 
on table games, horse races, sporting events, elections, etc.
3) The hospitality and tourism industry will successfully lobby governments to 
allow “gaming rooms” and “mini-casinos” in hotels, convention centres, and 
tourist attractions.
4) Funding for charitable organizations will increasingly rely on gambling 
revenues, such as from lotteries, raffles, casino nights, and grants from 
government sponsored gambling.
Along with these forecasted Canadian trends, the need to further study gambling 
exists since most of the available research investigating the nature of problem gambling 
utilizes samples from either the United States or Australia, and there is growing evidence 
that the Canadian experience is unique (Beaudoin & Cox, 1999; Wynne, 2002). In a 
study by Govoni, Frisch, Rupcich, and Getty (1999), the authors looked at the impact of 
casino gambling a year after it was introduced into a specific community. Although not 
statistically significant, the study found some evidence of gamblers spending more 
money after the opening of the casino.
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Currently, problem gambling is classified as an impulse control disorder 
alongside kleptomania, pyromania, etc. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This 
diagnostic taxonomy perpetuates theory and speculation over the exact role of 
impulsivity in gambling. To this end, models of problem gambling have attempted to 
map the pathways to the development of gambling problems. These attempts include 
various typologies and routes to development.
Pathways to Problem Gambling
In 1970, Moran published an article that made one of the first references to 
impulsivity in problem gambling. In his article, he described five subtypes of gamblers: 
impulsive, subcultural, neurotic, psychopathic, and symptomatic. He described the 
impulsive subtype as presenting with increasing loss of control with an associated 
ambivalence towards the gambling activity. Higher degrees of disturbance also described 
the impulsive gamblers.
Current attempts by Blaszczynski and colleagues also suggest typologies of, and 
pathways to the development of, problem gamblers. In the conceptual pathway model, 
Blaszczynski (2002), and Blaszczynski and Nower (2002), identify three main subgroups: 
normal, emotionally vulnerable, and biologically based impulsive gamblers. This premise 
is a model that attempts to integrate biological, personality, developmental, cognitive, 
learning theory, and environmental factors. Although based primarily on clinical 
experience, there is scope for empirical investigation.
To begin with, the assumption is that all three groups are exposed to the common 
influences of ecological factors, cognitive processes, and contingencies of reinforcement. 
The ecological factors involve public policy issues that may promote the availability and
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accessibility to gambling and gambling resources. The cognitive processes and 
contingencies of reinforcement draw from classical and operant conditioning. The 
postulate is that conditioning to gambling cues results in the urge to gamble which leads 
to habitual patterns of gambling. The development of cognitive schemas is thought to 
overlay this conditioning. For example, early and repeated wins may result in a set of 
irrational beliefs that promote gambling behaviour as a successful source of income. The 
reinforcing nature of gambling coupled with irrational schemas fortifies patterns of 
habitual gambling (Blaszczynski, 2002; Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002).
Although the three factors mentioned above are relevant to all gamblers, 
additional features differentiate the three subtypes of gamblers.
1. Normal Gamblers. This type of gambler meets the formal criteria for
problem gambling at the peak of their gambling disorder, but does not have 
any premorbid psychopathology. Patterns of gambling behaviour fall 
within the range of regular to heavy gambling and excessive gambling. 
Generally, gambling is a result of bad judgments or poor decision-making, 
as opposed to psychological disturbance.
Normal gamblers experience a preoccupation with gambling, chase 
losses, and manifest depression and anxiety because of the financial 
pressures associated with repeated losses. Clinically, their difficulties are 
the least severe of the three subtypes as there is generally no, or limited, 
premorbid psychopathology, substance abuse, or impulsivity. They are also 
more motivated to engage in treatment and comply with instructions, 
requiring minimal intervention.
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2. Emotionally Disturbed Gamblers. Unlike the previous group, emotionally 
disturbed gamblers generally have psychological vulnerabilities that 
predispose them to gambling. They are motivated in their gambling 
behaviours to reduce or modulate various affective states, seeing gambling 
as a means of escaping their depression, anxiety, or other external stresses. 
This subtype often presents with histories that include problem gambling in 
the family, poor developmental experiences, neurotic personality traits, and 
negative life events. Because of the psychological disturbance, this group 
of gamblers is more resistant to change, and requires treatment that 
addresses both the underlying vulnerabilities as well as the gambling 
problem.
3. Biologically Based Impulsive Gamblers. Unlike the previous two groups, 
this type of gambler is defined by neurological or neurochemical 
dysfunction reflected in impulsive and antisocial features. For this type of 
gambler, the differential response to rewards and punishments is the result 
of biologically based impulsivity. They actively seek out rewarding 
activities, display difficulties in delaying gratification, and have impaired 
responses to punishment. Even when the consequences of their actions are 
painful, they do not alter their behaviours. As such, they are the most 
difficult to treat with respect to their gambling problems.
Although this model of problem gamblers is still preliminary, it provides a 
valuable heuristic for classifying the various types of gambling behaviours in both 
research and clinical situations. The third group in particular has been the focus of
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considerable research. Despite the equivocal understanding of problem gambling, a large 
body of empirical investigation has focused on the various biological and psychological 
correlates in an attempt to understand gambling behaviours.
Biological Research in Problem Gambling
Research investigating the potential biological components of problem gambling 
has found that gamblers present with varied responses to neurochemicals. A number of 
researchers have shown that gamblers may respond to treatment with selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (Blanco, Petkova, Ibanez, & Saiz-Ruiz, 1999; Hollander, 
DeCaria, Mari, Wong, Mosovich, Grossman, & Begaz, 1998; Hollander, DeCaria, 
Hankell, Begaz, Wong, & Cartwright, 2000; Lopez-Ibor, 1988; Moreno, Saiz-Ruiz, & 
Lopez-Ibor, 1991).
Blanco, Ibanez, Blanco-Jerez, Baca-Garcia, and Saiz-Ruiz (2001) studied the 
plasma testosterone levels and psychological characteristics of male problem gamblers. 
They hypothesized that since impulsive behaviours in other groups who had abnormal 
serotonergic function and scores on measure of psychopathic behaviours had high levels 
of testosterone, perhaps this hormone was also involved in the pathophysiology of 
problem gambling. Unlike the relationship between problem gambling and serotonin, 
however, the results of this study found that problem gamblers did not have elevated 
levels of testosterone compared to healthy non-impulsive controls.
Research has also found altered dopaminergic and noradrenergic action in 
problem gamblers (Bergh, Eklund, Sodersten, & Nordin, 1997; Carrasco, Saiz-Ruiz, 
Hollander, Cesar, & Lopez-Ibor, 1994; Comings, Rosenthal, Lesieur, & Rugle, 1996). 
Bergh, et al. (1997) examine the possibility that problem gamblers have altered
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neurotransmission of monoamine. With ten problem gamblers and seven controls, 
samples of the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) were tested for monoamines and their 
metabolites. Results of the study suggest a change in the function of the dopaminergic 
system (which possibly mediates positive and negative reward) and the function of the 
noradrenergic system (which possibly mediates selective attention).
Similarly, the work of Comings, et al. (1996) outlines earlier research that showed 
the incidence of the D2A1 allele in substance abusers. As such, it is suggested the D2A1 
allele for the dopamine D2 receptor gene is present in problem gamblers. Comings, et al. 
(1996) report that evaluations of problem gamblers based on severity of problems show 
that 63.8% of gamblers in the high severity range carry the D2A1 allele. Conversely, only 
40.9% of gamblers in the low severity range carry the allele. Interestingly, 76.2% of 
problem gamblers in the sample who are comorbid alcohol abusers carry the gene 
compared to 49.1% of males who do not have a comorbid alcohol abuse/dependency 
issue.
Studying the EEGs (electroencephalograms) of gamblers shows a difference from 
controls and a similarity to the EEGs of attention-deficit disorder (ADD) children 
(Goldstein, Manowitz, Nora, Swartzburg, & Carlton, 1985). Further, when comparing 
nonsubstance dependent gamblers and “healthy” controls, gamblers are significantly 
more impaired in their memory and concentration (Regard, Knoch, Gutling, & Landis, 
2003). In this sample, the EEGs of 67% of gamblers also reveal dysfunctional activity 
compared to only 26% of controls. The Regard, et al., study concludes that otherwise 
“healthy” problem gamblers evidence a greater number of brain injuries, fronto-temporo- 
limbic neuropsychological dysfunctions, and EEG abnormalities.
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Psychological Research in Problem Gambling
With respect to psychological research in the area, Blaszczynski and McConaghy 
(1989) look at anxiety and depression as possible determinants in the maintenance of 
gambling behaviours. Results indicate some support for the notion that problem gambling 
is a behavioural stress reaction. While the problem gamblers in the study have a moderate 
level of depression, there are no differences from the normative sample on the state or 
trait anxiety scores.
A large body of research has also looked at the relationship between problem 
gambling and the use of substances. Results from the St. Louis epidemiological 
catchments survey have found that problem gamblers are at an increased risk for several 
diagnoses, including alcoholism and tobacco dependence (Cunningham-Williams,
Cottier, Compton, & Spitznagel, 1998). Problem gamblers in an addictions treatment 
facility have greater disturbance when compared to non-problem gamblers on measures 
of premorbid risk, problem substance use, and psychiatric comorbidity (Langenbucher, 
Bavly, Labouvie, Sanjuan, & Martin, 2001). Finally, Maccallum and Blaszczynski (2002) 
have found that substance abuse is a common comorbid condition in problem gambling, 
and the rates for substance abuse disorders in a sample of treatment-seeking problem 
gamblers is higher than the general population.
In addition to substance use, Rosenthal and Lesieur (1992) have reported that 
problem gamblers experience withdrawal symptoms similar to those of individuals with 
substance-use disorders. Other clinical reports have noted that gamblers indicate “highs” 
similar to those experienced by using cocaine and other drugs. This has also involved a
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distinct craving for the “feel” of gambling and developing a tolerance at which point 
greater risks are taken to achieve the same level of arousal (Blum, 2000).
Impulsivity and Disinhibition
Prior to the discussion of impulsivity and gambling, it is necessary to delineate the 
current understanding of impulsivity or disinhibition as a construct. Recent research in 
the area of impulsivity has focused on a wide range of disorders and personality 
characteristics. This research includes impulsivity's relationship to irritability and 
aggression (Stanford, Greve, & Dickens, 1995; Milligan & Waller, 2001), alcohol 
use/abuse and related perceptions (Marinkovic, Halgren, Klopp, & Maltzman, 2000; 
McCarthy, Miller, Smith, & Smith, 2001), personality disorders (Caseras, Torrubia, & 
Farre, 2001), cocaine use (Moeller, Dougherty, Barratt, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001b), 
sexual behaviours (McCoul & Haslam, 2001), and gambling (Langewisch & Frisch,
1998; McDaniel, 2002; Petry, 2001b; Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998).
Although impulsivity is a defining criterion in a number of psychological 
diagnoses, as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -  4th 
edition (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), there remains 
inconsistency in the definition of the term. This inconsistency and lack of agreement for a 
definition of impulsivity has also been the focus of considerable research (i.e., Barratt, 
1985; Kindlon, Mezzacappa, & Earls, 1995; Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & 
Swann, 2001a).
Kindlon, et al. (1995), states that this disagreement emerged partly because 
impulsivity has several manifestations, from cognitive to emotional to motor 
presentations. As such, there is more than one plausible pathway resulting in what,
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superficially, appears to be the same behaviour. Related to the multiple possible 
manifestations of impulsivity, Barratt (1985) made efforts to develop a definition of 
impulsiveness that was independent of other personality traits, had clinical utility, and 
was measurable by methods other than self-report. By reviewing past item analyses of 
item pools from self report questionnaires claiming to assess impulsiveness, a factor 
analysis of the impulsiveness items indicated this trait did not consist of a single 
dimension.
Barratt’s (1985) research concludes there are three factors that consistently appear 
in the studies reviewed:
1) a motor impulsiveness subtrait that involves action without accompanying 
thought, and is similar to Eysenck and Eysenck’s (1977) “impulsiveness 
narrow” factor
2) a cognitive impulsiveness subtrait which encompasses rapid cognitive 
decisions, separate from motor impulsiveness, and similar to the Eysenck 
and Eysenck (1977) idea of “impulsiveness broad”
3) a non-planning impulsiveness that identifies a lack of future planning or 
consideration of consequences.
In addition to the three factors, the factor analysis of the impulsivity items also led 
him to conclude that these subtraits were independent of other personality traits and had 
their own clinical utility. Barratt (1985) did note that, although several studies had 
recognized a risk-taking factor, this factor was more distinctive of socialization or 
sensation-seeking as opposed to impulsivity.
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Kindlon, et al. (1995), elucidate the motivational and cognitive domains of 
impulsivity. The motivational domain entails individual differences in sensitivity to both 
punishment and reward (Bachorowski & Newman, 1990; Gray, 1985, 1987; Newman & 
Bachorowski, 1990), passive-avoidance learning (Newman, Patterson, & Kosson, 1987), 
and delay of gratification (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriquez, 1989). The cognitive domain is 
more concerned with the (in)ability to inhibit a dominant response, as well as other 
processing impairments. Inhibitory control, therefore, is limited to those cortical 
functions responsible for response modulation, planning, or the inhibition of behaviour.
Moeller, et al. (2001a), published an exhaustive article in the hopes of bridging 
clinical and research work on the definition and measurement of impulsivity. Of interest 
is their biopsychosocial definition of impulsivity, which is similar to the work of Barratt 
(1985) and Kindlon, et al. (1995). This definition stipulates that any comprehensive 
understanding of impulsivity needs to include the decreased sensitivity to negative 
consequences of behaviour, the lack of regard for long-term consequences, and the rapid, 
unplanned reactions to stimuli without adequately processing available information. They 
further define impulsivity as a predisposition, and part of a pattern of behaviour, rather 
than a single act. Since impulsive behaviours involve rapid, unplanned actions without 
conscious processing and weighing of consequences, impulsivity should be distinct from 
compulsive behaviour or impaired judgment, and this distinction has both clinical and 
research relevance.
As previous conceptualizations of impulsivity indicate, there are both motor and 
cognitive components, as well as a motivational component. In addition, there is 
consistent agreement that there is a need for a clearer understanding of what impulsive
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behaviour entails. The ubiquity of impulse control problems in psychopathology and 
limited understanding of impulsivity as a construct emphasizes the need to continue to 
investigate this phenomenon. Because of the pervasive and equivocal nature of impulse 
control problems, a goal of clinical research should be to understand which psychological 
processes, such as inhibitory functions, present abnormally in particular disorders 
(Wakefield, 1992).
Lack of inhibitions, or disinhibition, refers to the limited control over response 
inclinations in human behaviour (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980). As previously stated, 
this involves response modulation, planning, or the control of specific behaviours 
(Kindlon, et al, 1995). Gorenstein and Newman (1980) state this concept of disinhibition 
is useful to understand the main deficits in psychopathology (e.g., psychopathy, child 
hyperactivity, hysteria, and alcoholism). In addition, a more coherent connection of 
specific inhibitory processes to different disorders adds to a more advanced, process- 
based description of psychopathology (Nigg, 2000). To this end, two specific theoretical 
approaches to inhibition are provided: passive-avoidance learning and the stop-signal 
paradigm.
Passive-avoidance Learning Paradigm
The concept of passive-avoidance learning deficits is related to the idea that, in 
some individuals (i.e., impulsives), there is a diminished ability to inhibit reward 
(positive reinforcement) motivated responses, even when the possibility for punishment 
is present (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980). Newman and colleagues suggest that 
dysfunction caused by lesions in the septal-hippocampal region of the upper brainstem in 
rats {septal syndrome -  hyperactivity, response perseveration, etc.) acts as an analogue
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for the various psychological mechanisms that underlie a number of human disinhibitory 
pathologies such as substance abuse, alcoholism, and psychopathy. The septal lesion 
model (Patterson & Newman, 1993) provides a heuristic for the elaboration of the core 
processes of human disinhibition.
The septal lesion model, the premise for Gray’s Psychobiological Model o f  
Personality (1985, 1987, 1991), is the model that Newman and colleagues’ extend in 
their passive-avoidance learning paradigm (Patterson & Newman, 1993). The 
psychobiological model works primarily from the principles of classical conditioning and 
motivation, and involves four systems: the behavioural activation system (BAS), the 
behavioural inhibition system (BIS), the fight/flight system (F/F), and the non-specific 
arousal system (NAS). The first two, the BIS and the BAS, are mutually competitive 
systems (see Table 1: Summary of Psychobiological Model of Personality).
The Behavioural Activation System (BAS). The BAS is responsible for approach 
behaviours. It activates motor responses to signals of reward, and activates avoidance 
behaviours when presented with frustrative nonreward (that is, the perception that pursuit 
of a previously rewarding stimulus would now be frustrating) or punishment. According 
to the model, ascending dopaminergic fibres in the appetitive (reward) system of the 
brain neurally mediate the BAS. These dopaminergic fibres extend from the subcortical 
structures of the brain to the prefrontal cortex.
When the BAS is engaged, by signals of reward and/or nonpunishment, there is a 
corresponding increase in cortical arousal which encourages approach (to rewards) and 
active avoidance (of punished) behaviours. If an individual has an overactive BAS, s/he 
routinely detects rewarding stimuli, as opposed to those with an under active BAS. As
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such, when already primed for rewards, an overactive BAS leads to more repeated 
approach behaviours regardless of potential punishments.
The Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS). Also regarded as the anxiety system, the 
subcortical septal-hippocampal structure, as well as the thalamus and midbrain, mediate 
the BIS. There are two modes of operation within the BIS: checking and control. The 
checking mode, mediated by the hippocampus, functions to determine whether current 
stimuli is consistent with what is expected, and to estimate what will come next. The 
control mode is engaged when triggering cues (i.e., learned signals for punishment or 
nonreward, unconditional fear stimuli, etc.) are detected. Upon detection of the triggering 
cues, the BIS results in three behavioural outputs: stopping of the ongoing motor activity 
(passive-avoidance), heightened arousal, and increased attention to the environment and 
triggering stimuli.
In contrast to the action of the BAS, an overactive BIS results in a greater 
likelihood of inhibiting approach behaviours in the face of punishment, while an under 
active BIS increases the likelihood of not inhibiting such behaviours. An under active 
BIS, therefore, predisposes people to having a lower sensitivity to punishment cues.
The Fight/Flight System (F/F). Rather than responding to cues for punishment or 
cues for nonreward as the BIS does, the F/F system responds to actual pain 
(unconditional punishment) and actual nonreward. The F/F is hypothesized to involve the 
ventromedial hypothalamus and the amygdala. Activation of the F/F generates active 
avoidance or escape (flight) behaviours, or defensive aggression (fight), depending on
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Table 1
Summary o f Psychobiological Model o f Personality
COMPETITIVE SYSTEMS
BAS BIS F/F NAS
WHERE?
mediated by dopaminergic fibres 
which extend from subcortical 
structures to prefrontal cortex
mediated by subcortical septal- 
hippocampal structure, midbrain, 
and thalamus
hypothesized to involve the 
ventromedial hypothalamus and 
amygdala
connected to the reticular 
activating system
HOW?
signals o f reward and 
nonpunishment increase 
subcortical arousal and activate the 
BAS
* encourages approach towards 
reward
* encourages active avoidance of  
punishment
If checking mode - determines 
whether current stimuli is 
consistent with what is expected 
and estimates what will come 
next
21 control mode -  engaged when 
learned signals for punishment 
and nonreward are detected
unlike BIS which responds to 
cues for punishment and 
nonreward, F/F responds to 
actual pain (unconditional 
punishment)
responds positively to 
activation o f either BIS or 
BAS
WHAT?
1) activates motor response to 
signals of reward
2) activates avoidance behaviour 
when presented with nonreward or 
punishment
detection o f learned signals for 
punishment and nonreward 
results in 3 behavioural outputs:
1) stop the ongoing motor 
activity (passive avoidance)
2) heightened arousal
3) increased attention to the 
environment
depending on the 
environmental context:
1) generates active avoidance or 
escape (flight) behaviours, or
2) generates defensive 
aggression (fight)
because the presence o f cues 
for punishment or reward 
results in heightened arousal 





because the BAS is activated by 
cues for reward, if  there is an 
overactive BAS, the person 
constantly looks for/detects 
rewarding stimuli and the prospect 
of reward overrides the possibility 
of punishment
an under active BIS predisposes 
people to have less sensitivity to 
(higher threshold for) cues for 
punishment, whereas an 
overactive BIS results in the 
greater likelihood o f inhibiting 
approach
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what stimuli are present in the environmental context. Gray’s (1987) model, however, 
also indicates that activation of the BIS can inhibit activation of the F/F.
The Non-specific Arousal System (NAS). Also considered the modulating system, 
the NAS connects to the ascending reticular activation system, and responds positively to 
activation of either the BIS or the BAS. Because the presence of cues for punishment or 
reward results in heightened arousal and alertness, the ensuing behavioural response is 
intensified. Heightened sensitivity to reward is a frequent presentation of disinhibited 
individuals who fail to learn from aversive feedback. It is this system (activated due to an 
overactive BAS) which Newman and his colleagues (1987,1993) have expanded upon in 
their passive-avoidance learning model. In other words, in disinhibited people an 
overactive BAS makes it difficult to withhold appetitively-motivated responses in the 
face of potential punishment.
In 1987, J. P. Newman first published a detailed account of the passive-avoidance
•j
deficits present in extraverts and psychopaths , providing a potential mechanism for the 
impulsive behaviours of disinhibited individuals that tied into Gray’s Psychobiological 
Model (see Figure 1). This four-stage mechanism of response modulation consisted of:
1) The establishment of an approach response set. Disinhibited individuals
experience a deficiency in response modulation when they are acting 
within a context for reward. Any possibility of reward results in an 
emotional/motivational state, characteristic of which is a proclivity to
2 The term “psychopath” is operationally defined as a score o f 30 or greater on the Hare Psychopathy 
Checklist -  Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003), and meets the descriptive/diagnostic criteria defined within the 
PCL-R. “Psychopathy” and “psychopath” are constructs which are different from, and should not be 
confused with, the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2004) diagnosis o f Antisocial 
Personality Disorder.
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respond and a resistance to change the positive response set. Alternatively, 
if presented with a situation in which there is no demand to change the 
established response, a disinhibited person will perform as well as non- 
disinhibited individuals. According to Gray’s model, disinhibited or 
impulsive individuals are more likely to establish dominant response sets 
for reward with greater frequency due to the BAS function of responding 
to reward situations.
2) In situations where there is punishment, omission of a reward, or a delayed 
reward, disinhibited individuals experience an incremental increase in 
non-specific arousal. The increase in non-specific arousal then leads to an 
amplification of the reaction to the aversive event. If an individual has an 
overactive BAS, s/he is more stimulated to make approach responses, 
thereby experiencing even greater levels of arousal following the aversive 
event.
3) When there is increased arousal, impulsive people tend to persevere with 
previously rewarded responses because of failures in response modulation 
or retrospective reflection. As such, disinhibited individuals are less likely 
to alter their response set, resulting in response facilitation. An overactive 
BAS determines this process. Conversely, an under active BAS results in a 
passive coping response such as behaviour inhibition and the beginning of 
information processing aimed at predicting possible future aversive 
events. It is important to note, however, that this is due to the normal 
operation of the BIS, assuming a normally functioning BIS. It is the
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Figure 1
Four Stage Response Modulation (Newman, 1987)
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indirect result of an under active BAS that allows a stronger BIS to 
predominate.
4) Finally, if reflecting on negative feedback (i.e., punishments, non reward, 
etc.) happens, associations to the stimulus context are produced. Since 
disinhibited people lack this retrospective reflection, learning from 
aversive events is deficient. As a result, an overactive BAS predisposes 
disinhibited individuals to experience the same aversive event in the 
future.
The implications of this mechanism for response modulation are two-fold.
First, because of the emotional reaction to punishment, disinhibited individuals are more 
likely to respond in a reflex-like style when presented with negative feedback. Poor 
quality rapid responding, with limited forethought characterizes this style. Second, 
because of the emotional reaction, the negative feedback experiences are not adequately 
processed. These individuals, therefore, do not have the same network of associations 
regarding negative events as non-impulsive people, and are more likely to be lead by 
prospects of reward rather than the threat of punishment.
Avila (2001), using the theoretical framework of Gray, studied disinhibited 
behaviours, and attempted to assess the model of Newman and colleagues. Utilizing a 
point scoring reaction time (RT) procedure in four different experiments, Avila attempted 
to differentiate two disinhibitory mechanisms associated with the BIS and the BAS. 
Results were consistent with the work of Newman, et al. (1987, 1993), in that the BAS 
mediated mechanism was related to lacking inhibition in approach behaviours following 
the introduction of punishments. The BAS mediated mechanism was also related to
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deficits in learning from aversive cues when responding for reward. The BIS mediated 
mechanism linked to a greater capacity to extinguish aversive associations, and linked to 
less interference of approach behaviours when presented with aversive stimuli. Corr 
(2003) also empirically demonstrated that the BIS and BAS systems do not always 
function independently. The two systems, however, often have a moderating effect on 
one another.
The theoretical approach to disinhibition described above has generated research 
to determine how the response modulation mechanism manifests in various 
psychopathologies. For example, Nichols and Newman (1986), studied the behavioural 
reactions of extroverts and introverts to punishments and rewards, and found that 
introverts were more likely to pause after punishment (allowing for response reflection), 
even while seeking reward. Extroverts, on the other hand, tended to form response sets 
that were resistant to interruption. Sometimes, these response sets were even more likely 
repeated following punishment.
Further to the development of the model, Newman and colleagues have developed 
a task, the Passive-Avoidance Task, to measure how individuals learn to inhibit 
responses. Briefly, it is a variant of the go/no-go task in which subjects are required to 
learn when responding to a stimulus results in either reward or punishment. In the 
primary task condition (reward and punishment, PALR), a subject is shown a set of eight 
numbers (one number at a time), and is required to learn which four of the eight numbers 
are ‘good’, or positive stimuli (S+), and which four of the eight numbers are ‘bad’, or 
negative stimuli (S-). When the subject correctly responds to the S+/‘good’ numbers s/he 
receives a small monetary reward. The subject is punished (loss of money) when s/he
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responds to the S-/‘bad’ numbers. Additional tasks include a reward only condition (RRT) 
and a punishment only condition (PANR). All three conditions are described in greater 
detail in the Methods section.
At present, the majority of the research conducted with the Passive-Avoidance 
Task and paradigm have used samples of extroverts/introverts and psychopaths. 
Patterson, Kosson, and Newman (1987), used this task to explore the mechanism 
underlying passive-avoidance learning, and its relation to extraversion, neuroticism, and 
response latency after punishment. Results showed that extroverts commit more passive- 
avoidance errors (responding when they should not, and therefore, experiencing 
punishment) than introverts, and more frequently fail to pause following punished errors 
when compared to introverts. For both extroverts and introverts, instances of longer 
pausing following punishment result in better learning from the punishment. This 
suggests that, when cues for reward are present, the reaction of extraverts to punishment 
(i.e., not pausing) interferes with processing the punished errors, leaving them more 
likely to repeat these errors in an impulsive, non-reflective action. Similar findings are 
present in research with psychopaths (Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman, Widom, & 
Nathan, 1985), and in the presence of monetary incentives (Newman, Patterson, & 
Kosson, 1987).
Patterson and Newman (1993) again look at extroverts and introverts on the 
passive-avoidance task using two conditions: one with both rewards and punishments 
(PALR), and one with punishments only (PANR). They report that extroverts in the PALR 
condition commit significantly more passive-avoidance errors (i.e., respond to more no- 
go cues) than introverts. In the PANR condition, however, extroverts and introverts are
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equally effective in learning to inhibit responses when not being punished is the only 
incentive for responding correctly. Following this study, a new element to passive- 
avoidance deficits becomes apparent: the interaction between individual differences and 
situational variables. Therefore, when not required to switch between approach and 
avoidance contingencies, extroverts do not exhibit the same deficits.
In contrast to the research conducted with males (as most of the previous studies 
have been), Segarra, Molto, and Torrubia (2000) examine the manifestation of passive- 
avoidance in extroverted females. Results show that, unlike the research with males, the 
PALR condition does not produce passive-avoidance error differences between neurotic 
extroverts and stable introverts. Interestingly, when the PALR condition is the first 
administered, neurotic introverts make more passive-avoidance errors than other groups. 
In addition, stable extroverts display behavioural disinhibition when the PANR condition 
is administered second. Although the results are contradictory to previous studies (where 
introverts, in their ability to learn to passively avoid, are as deficient as extroverts), this 
research merely highlights the complexity of disinhibition.
Overall, the passive-avoidance learning theory, with the corresponding research, 
maintains that the impulsive behavioural style of disinhibited individuals arises due to 
their active, non-reflective reactions to aversive stimuli. When these individuals 
participate in reward-seeking behaviours, they experience a strong biopsychosocial 
response to events or stimuli that might fail to prevent, disturb, or punish their approach 
behaviours. This response style easily becomes maladaptive in that disinhibited 
individuals continue to experience negative consequences as they do not slow down and 
reflect to learn from experience.
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Despite the promising nature of the passive-avoidance learning model, there are 
only a limited number of clinical populations used in research (i.e., psychopaths, 
introverts/extroverts). In order to determine if this pattern of disinhibition manifests 
similarly in other impulse-disordered psychopathologies, further research needs to be 
undertaken. This would allow for a greater understanding of impulsive presentations, and 
a more distinct understanding of impulsivity as a construct.
The Stop-Signal Paradigm
Similar to the passive-avoidance learning paradigm espoused by Newman et al., 
the Stop-Signal Paradigm is a model of disinhibition that also provides a method of 
understanding the cognitive and motor components of impulsive behaviours. In everyday 
situations, people are able to interrupt, restrain, or rapidly change behaviours deemed 
inappropriate by sudden changes or events. This ability implies internally generated 
cognitive and motor inhibitory responses, and has considerable functional and survival 
importance.
In one of their introductory articles, Logan and Cowan (1984) present the stop- 
signal paradigm, and attempt to link the ideas of motor control and of cognitive control 
by developing a model whereby either perspective explains control. For these 
researchers, ‘control’ is an exchange between the executive system and the subordinate 
system. The executive system is responsible for forming intentions, and issuing 
commands for these intentions to be fulfilled. The subordinate system interprets the 
commands issued by the executive system and completes the assignment. In this 
interaction, the sequence of acts o f control is the actions of the executive system. It is 
these acts of control that are analyzed behaviourally.
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For Logan and Cowan (1984), the act of control investigated is the ability to 
inhibit both thoughts and actions once the thoughts and actions are no longer relevant to 
current goals. Although quick to indicate that inhibition is not the only act of control for 
which the executive system is responsible, the researchers feel it is important for both 
motor control (e.g., stopping oneself from hitting a tennis ball that is already called out of 
bounds) and cognitive control (e.g., suppressing a negative comment).
While other theories of performance and behaviour assume that two signals must 
be processed quickly and in sequence for action to occur, the stop-signal paradigm 
assumes there is no relationship between 1) the processes which respond to a stimulus, 
and 2) the processes which respond to information indicating an action should be 
inhibited (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984). As a result, when a command is given to stop 
a response that has already started, the two processes start to race (race model). In other 
words, the response or ‘go’ processes are racing against the inhibiting or ‘stop’ processes.
The race model of response inhibition assumes there are two sets of processes that 
operate independently (as presented above). The first set of processes begins at the start 
of the task stimulus (the ‘go’ task), resulting in the launch and conclusion of a response; 
the ‘go’ process. In a lab setting, this might be a choice reaction time (RT) task where a 
subject responds to a specific stimulus. The second set of processes does not begin until a 
stop-signal occurs, and this results in the inhibition of the response; the ‘stop’ process. In 
the lab, this stop-signal could be a tone or loud noise. Accordingly, the response is either 
completed or withheld based on which process wins the race. Within this model, 
someone is more likely to inhibit his or her response when the stop-signal closely follows 
the task stimulus {stop-signal delay). If the stop-signal is delayed for too long after the
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‘go’ signal, the ‘go’ signal process “wins the race” (see Figure 2: Race Model of the 
Stop-Signal Paradigm).
Figure 2
Race Model o f  the Stop-Signal Paradigm (Band, van der Molan, & Logan, 2003)
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The stop signal is presented after a SOA (stimulus-onset asynchrony) relative to the go- 
signal. The stop-processes finish after the SSRT (stop-signal reaction time) relative to the 
stop-signal onset. When the SSRT is assumed to be constant, this finishing time intersects 
the density function of go-RT. Reponses from the left part of the go-RT density function 
are too fast to be inhibited whereas responses from the right part are stopped correctly. 
Therefore, the finishing time of the stop-process divides the go-RT density function into 
the RR (response rate) and the inhibition rate.
As stated, whether a response is inhibited is dependent upon the relative finishing 
times of the ‘go’ process and the ‘stop’ process. The term “finishing time” refers to the 
amount of time it takes between the start of the ‘go’ signal and the response, or the 
amount of time between the start of the ‘stop’ signal and its hypothetical ending. Note 
that the duration or finishing time of the ‘go’ process is directly observable in those trials 
when no subsequent stop-signal is given: the finishing time is the distance between the 
‘go’ signal and the response. Duration or finishing times of ‘stop’ processes are not
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directly observable since successful inhibition on those trials in which a stop-signal 
occurs does not result in a specific observable event. Rather, notable is the absence of an 
event, or, the absence of responding to the go signal. Determining the relative finishing 
times requires at least the following four factors: 1) the stop-signal delay; 2) the mean RT 
to the primary ‘go’ task; 3) the mean RT to the stop-signal; and, 4) the variance of RT to 
the ‘go’ task (Logan, et al., 1984). Knowledge of the probability of inhibition and the 
distribution of the ‘go’ task RT allow for estimation of the point in time at which the 
response to the stop-signal occurred. Once this estimate is determined, subtracting out the 
stop-signal delay predicts the stop-signal RT.
Although the actual mechanisms involved are still speculative due to limited 
empirical evidence, there are two mechanisms hypothesized to interrupt or withhold 
speeded responses. First is a central mechanism that operates by inhibiting response 
activation processes within cortical motor structures so that motor commands are not 
completed. The second mechanism is peripheral, and operates to prevent the peripheral 
motor structures from executing central motor commands (De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 
1995).
In addition to the primary task, the model makes additional predictions about RTs 
on those trials which have a stop-signal, but the individual responds regardless (signal- 
respond trials). It states that the mean signal-response RTs should be faster than mean no­
signal response RTs. In addition, the signal-respond RTs should increase as the stop- 
signal delay increases (Logan, et al., 1984).
Overall, the model predicts that the effects of the stop-signal delay and the ‘go’ 
task RT can compensate for each other. Therefore, the probability of responding given
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the presentation of a stop-signal should not change if there are changes to other aspects 
(i.e., ‘go’ task RT, stop-signal delay, etc.). As such, the stop-signal paradigm and 
accompanying task (described in more detail in the Methods section), are useful in 
measuring the inherent ability to inhibit actions.
A number of research studies have used the stop-signal paradigm to assess the 
ability to inhibit thought and action. De Jong, et al. (1995) attempt to extend the study of 
motor inhibition beyond all-or-none situations to conditions that require selective motor 
inhibition where some responses are inhibited but not others. They also attempt to test the 
notion of two functionally distinct inhibition mechanisms, labelled executive and 
peripheral. Results of this study support the concept of functionally distinct mechanisms 
and strategies responsible for inhibitory motor control in various circumstances.
Another study utilizing the stop-signal paradigm is one by Logan, Schachar, and 
Tannock (1997), in which impulsivity is operationalized as a deficit in inhibitory 
processes. According to the race model of the stop-signal paradigm, poor inhibitory 
control has two possible causes: responding too quickly to the ‘go’ signal so that a 
response is executed before the person can respond to the stop-signal; or, responding too 
slowly to the stop-signal so that normally rapid responses to the ‘go’ signal evade 
inhibition. In studies of children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (AD/HD), 
conduct disorder (CD), or both, slow stop-signal RTs are responsible for poor impulse 
control. Children with AD/HD inhibit less often than control children, even though their 
go-signal RTs are longer than normal children (Logan, et al, 1997; Oosterlaan, Logan, & 
Sergeant, 1998).
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In a study with 136 undergraduate students, there was a significant relationship 
between impulsivity, as measured by the impulsivity subscale of the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory, and inhibitory control. Participants identified as highly impulsive had longer 
stop-signal RTs. This corroborated the idea that impulsive individuals did not necessarily 
have exceptionally rapid responding, but they did have exceptionally slow ‘stop’ 
responses (Logan, et al, 1997).
Similar to the passive-avoidance paradigm, in which impulsive individuals show 
deficits in response inhibition and have limited ability to inhibit strongly established 
response sets for reward, the stop-signal paradigm has a comparable dominant ‘go’ task.
It is possible that the need to complete this ‘go’ task is so resilient, that there is impaired 
processing of a secondary cue like the stop-signal, resulting in a deficit in inhibitory 
control. Also similar to the passive-avoidance paradigm, limited clinical samples have 
been researched with this approach and it is not clear how it translates to other impulse 
control disorders, such as problem gambling.
Disinhibition and Gamblers. A number of studies have looked at Impulsive 
behaviour and disinhibition with respect to gamblers. Blaszczynski, Steel, and 
McConaghy (1997) investigate the role of impulsivity and antisocial personality features 
within 115 male problem gamblers. They report that impulsivity contributed to the 
behavioural and psychological disturbance experienced by the gamblers. They are unable, 
however, to demonstrate the exact relevance of impulsivity to problem gambling. 
Similarly, Carlton and Manowitz (1994) report only a small correlation between degree 
of problem gambling and impulsivity. In an earlier study, however, they state that
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problem gamblers characterize themselves as having greater than normal numbers of 
ADD symptoms (Carlton & Manowitz, 1992).
Contrary to these studies, a number of researchers have reported strong 
associations between impulsivity and gambling. Castellani and Rugle (1995), in an 
analysis of data on 843 patients admitted to a Veteran’s Association (VA) hospital, 
compare 126 problem gamblers without a history of substance dependence to 505 
alcoholics and 212 cocaine addicts. The analysis shows that gamblers score significantly 
higher than the other groups on both impulsivity and the inability to resist cravings. The 
results of the study suggest that impulsivity in problem gamblers might be a function of 
lack of planning, rapid decision making, and taking action rather than waiting for 
entertaining or exiting experiences. These findings are consistent with those presented by 
Rugle and Melamud (1993) which suggest that gamblers exhibit significant problems 
with planning, anticipating consequences, learning from experiences, and inhibiting 
responses as required by complex situations.
Petry (2001a) examined the behavioural manifestations of impulsivity in problem 
gambling. The study finds that gamblers discount delayed rewards more frequently than 
controls, providing further evidence for the lack of planning and forethought suspected to 
be a core feature of impulse control in problem gamblers.
While there are a growing number of studies that have reported problem gamblers 
as attaining high scores on self-report measures of impulsivity (Blaszczynski, Steel, & 
McConaghy, 1997; Langewisch & Frisch, 1998), there remain significant discrepancies. 
As Castellani and Rugle (1995) note, the measurement scales utilized in the majority of 
studies assess impulsivity in terms of risk taking, excitement seeking, lack of planning,
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making quick decisions, and taking action without thought. Although there might be a 
moderate correlation between these factors, they still represent separate, independently 
varying constructs. Furthermore, the instruments most commonly utilized to measure 
impulsivity in individuals (i.e., the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, BIS-II; the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire, EPQ) do not assess the same sets of factors.
To illustrate this point, the definition of impulsivity in the psychological literature 
includes all or some of the following factors: motor impulsiveness such as unplanned and 
rapid reactions to stimuli without adequate processing of relevant information; a 
cognitive element such as a disregard for long-term consequences; and, a decreased 
sensitivity to negative consequences of behaviour (Barratt, 1985; Moeller, et al., 2001b). 
Seeing that there is growing evidence for an impulsive component to problem gambling, 
there is limited understanding as to how impulsivity manifests behaviourally and 
cognitively. Although some self-report investigations exist, there is little in the way of 
objective empirical research of the behavioural and cognitive expression of impulsivity 
within gamblers.
Limitations o f Research
The preceding pages discuss the various research areas, studies, and theoretical 
models concerning impulsivity and gambling. As the discourse continues, however, it is 
clear that a number of shortcomings in the different topic areas exist. First, there is only 
partial agreement among researchers and theoreticians as to what impulsivity, as a 
construct, entails. Although impulsivity and impulsive behaviours are common diagnostic 
criteria for a variety of disorders, the measurement and description of the construct is 
equally as varied. As Castellini and Rugle (1995) point out, the scales and measures used
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in current research are primarily self-report, and assess everything from lack of 
behavioural control to risk taking, with additional activities in between. Unfortunately, 
this lack of agreement between measurement instruments and definitions perpetuates the 
confused and sometimes contradictory accounts of what impulsivity describes within, and 
between, the impulse-related disorders.
Because of this confusion, two different sets of researchers have attempted to 
develop precise behavioural and cognitive measures of specific acts of control: learning 
from errors, and the ability to control thought and action. Newman and his colleagues 
have used the passive-avoidance learning paradigm to provide more specific accounts of 
individuals’ ability to use discriminative stimuli (i.e., cues for punishment) to withhold 
inappropriate approach behaviour. Results with psychopaths, extraverts, and substance 
users have shown that all three groups are disinhibited when presented with both rewards 
and punishments. These groups are preoccupied with reward-seeking behaviours and are 
unable to learn to withhold responses from the punishments they experience. Further 
research, however, needs to determine if all the impulse-related disorders also experience 
this deficit. One such group that needs more research is gamblers.
In addition, the stop-signal paradigm is also a promising measure of both 
cognitive and motor disinhibition. Unfortunately, the primary research in this area has 
been with AD/HD and conduct disordered children, or adults who might present with 
ADD-like symptoms. Research using this paradigm with other populations can determine 
if cognitive and motor inhibition present themselves similarly in all impulsive 
psychopathologies and disorders.
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Present Study
A number of studies show that gamblers experience impulsive urges and 
behaviours similar to extroverts, alcoholics, cocaine users, individuals with antisocial 
personality, and even adults and children with AD/HD (Blaszczynski, et al., 1997; 
Blaszczynski & Silove, 1996; Carlton & Manowitz, 1992; Castellani & Rugle, 1995; 
Goldstein, et al., 1985; Rosenthal & Lesieur, 1992; Roy, DeJong, & Linnoila, 1989; 
Rugle & Melamud, 1993; Steel & Blaszczynski, 1996).
Both the passive-avoidance learning model and the stop-signal paradigm have 
been studied in various impulse-related disorders. They have been able to illustrate the 
cognitive and motor processes involved in disinhibited behaviours within these disorders, 
but not within problem gamblers. Examining problem gamblers through these models 
will highlight objective aspects of problem gamblers from two validated theoretical 
approaches. This then provides another clinical and empirical benefit: by applying these 
models to problem gamblers, in addition to the populations that have already been 
studied, a clear link between specific inhibitory processes and different disorders adds to 
a more complete, process-based description of impulsive psychopathology (Nigg, 2000). 
Results from the tasks might clarify specific motor/behavioural and cognitive 
mechanisms, and provide specific objectives in assessment and treatment of those 
patterns that exacerbate and maintain gambling behaviours.
The stop-signal paradigm is a task that allows for the objective measurement of 
both cognitive and motor components of disinhibition, while the passive-avoidance 
paradigm provides more specific accounts of an individual’s ability to use discriminative
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stimuli (i.e., cues for punishment) to withhold inappropriate responses. Following from 
the literature available on these two models, it is hypothesized that:
1. a) Problem gamblers will exhibit a slow ‘stopping’ process when presented
with a stop-signal while performing the primary RT task on the stop-signal 
paradigm.
b) Problem gamblers will not have a corresponding increase in primary task RT. 
Therefore, RT to the primary task will be equal for problem gamblers and 
controls.
2. a) Problem gamblers will have difficulties withholding a response to avoid
punishment when they are already primed for rewards (greater passive- 
avoidance errors compared to controls in the reward/punishment, PALR, 
condition)
b) Problem gamblers will be equally proficient as controls on all other aspects 
of reward/punishment condition {PALR), reward only condition (RRI) or 
punishment only {PANR) conditions.
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Methodology
Participants
Power Analysis. An a priori power analysis was conducted using the G Power 
computer program (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992). Power analysis revealed that an ideal 
situation for ANOVA measures, with high power (0.95) and a medium effect size (0.95), 
would require an N  of 210 (105 participants in each group). Given that one of the groups 
was derived from a clinical population (Problem Gamblers), it was uncertain if this large 
an N  would be feasible. A compromise analysis showed that a total N  of 80 (n = 40 
participants in each group) provided an acceptable power value of 0.82, with a medium 
effect size d = .25, at ap  = 0.05.
Exclusion and Inclusion Criteria. Participants for this study were recruited 
through various community resources and the University of Windsor undergraduate 
participant pool. To be included in the study, subjects had to be a minimum of 18 years of 
age. Potential participants were directed to call the research lab. Those who called were 
asked to complete a telephone screening interview to determine suitability for the study. 
All potential participants were screened for a number of psychological diagnoses. For 
example, they were only included in the study if they did not endorse being depressed for 
a minimum of six months prior to participating, had not had a previous diagnosis, nor did 
they endorse the symptoms associated with the diagnosis, of Bipolar Disorder, Borderline 
Personality Disorder, or AD/HD.
Specific to the exclusion criteria, the requirement of no depression symptoms for 
at least six months was deemed important for the computer tasks which were reaction 
time based. Any motor or cognitive slowing which may accompany depressive symptoms
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would confound the results of a reaction time task. In addition, the Bipolar Disorder, 
Borderline Personality Disorder, and AD/HD diagnoses were excluded from the current 
study as the larger Disinhibition study being conducted utilized these diagnostic 
categories as separate groups of clinical interest (please see Appendix E for complete list 
of measures in the larger research project).
Finally, the telephone interview also included the Eight Gambling Screen 
(Sullivan, 2001). This was a brief, eight item, yes/no questionnaire that was a rapid tool 
to identify possible gambling problems. Those who endorsed four or more of these items 
were invited down to the lab as potential PGs. Once a participant was in the office for the 
research appointment, the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001) 
was completed. If the subject did not score greater than seven on this interview, their data 
was not included in the present research study as a Problem Gambler. Because of the use 
of a more stringent measure of problem gambling (see CPGI description in Tests and 
Materials for comparison to DSM-IV-TR diagnosis), there were fewer than anticipated 
subjects recruited into the problem gambling group.
With respect to the control group, participants again were screened using the same 
telephone screening interview. These potential subjects were deemed suitable if they met 
the same psychological diagnostic criteria as listed above. In addition, they would have 
answered fewer than four items in the keyed direction from the Eight Gambling Screen 
(Sullivan, 2001). All control subjects, however, did indicate that they had taken part in 
some type of gambling activity in the 12 months prior to the study. This was done to 
ensure that individuals in this group had exposure to gambling but did not experience any 
problems with it, nor were they in any way opposed to the idea of gambling in general.
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Because of the nature of the study and inclusion criteria, it was difficult to find suitable 
control subjects. As a result, a large number of the controls came from the university 
undergraduate population.
In addition, some individuals self-referred to the study as potential experimental 
(PG) subjects. If these subjects did not meet criteria under the above mentioned 
guidelines, they were included in the study as potential CTRLs. As a result, three 
individuals were included as CTRLs which were subsequently dropped from the analysis. 
These three subjects were dropped because, although they did not meet criteria as PGs, 
nor did they currently meet criteria for any other Axis I or II diagnosis, two of these 
subjects reported (during the actual data collection session) that they had suffered two or 
more concussions requiring hospitalizations and two of three subjects reported heavy 
cocaine use in the past. As a result, the CTRL group was reduced to 37 subjects.
Participants categorized as problem gamblers had a score of 7.5 or higher on the 
Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI). The non-problem gambling controls were 
individuals who indicated that they took part in some form of gambling in the 12 months 
prior to participating in the study (e.g., buying occasional lottery tickets, going to the 
casino), but had a CPGI score less than five. The CPGI categories are as follows:
0 = non-problem
1 — 2 = low risk gambling
3 -  7 = moderate risk gambling
8+ = problem gambling
Participant Demographics. The participants for this study consisted of a sample 
of 30 problem gamblers (PGs) (13 male, 17 female) and of 37 non-problem gambling
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controls (CTRLs) (14 male, 23 female). There was a significant age difference between 
the PGs (M= 35.2, SD = 16.60) and CTRLs (M= 25.78, SD = 9.45), 1(43.85) -  2.77,/? <
0.01 (equal variances not assumed).
Although there were significant age differences found between the two groups, 
previous research by Logan, et al., had looked at age differences on the stop-signal task. 
It was found that there were no significant age differences between any of the adult age 
groups from young adults in their late teens and early 20’s to older adults (55+). In 
addition, they found no gender differences (Logan, personal communication, April 10, 
2006; Schachar, personal communication, April 10, 2006; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, 
Logan, & Tannock, 1999; Bedard, Nichols, Barbosa, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 
2002).
Unfortunately, no such data existed in the passive-avoidance literature so it is not 
clear how, if at all, age and gender influenced the results of the present study. Because 
this model is primarily based on psychopaths, limited work has been done with 
psychopathy in women. There are no studies that have used the passive-avoidance 
paradigm in mixed gender samples. Some might suspect that because passive-avoidance 
learning deficits have been empirically associated with psychopathy, and because 
psychopathy is more prominent in males, males ought thereby, be presumed to score 
higher on the passive-avoidance paradigm. Both Borderline and Histrionic Personality 
Disorder, however, have impulsivity among their diagnostic criteria, both are more 
frequently diagnosed among women, and scores on the passive-avoidance learning 
paradigm have been observed to be higher among incarcerated female borderline 
prisoners than among matched female prisoner controls (Hochhausen, Lorenz, &
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Newman, 2002). Moreover, the present study concerns not impulsivity as such (which is 
at best, by all accounts already reviewed in the earlier chapter, a highly ambiguous 
construct), but rather a specific type of deficit in learning from experience. The passive- 
avoidance paradigm is based on Gray’s model of behavioural inhibition in which such a 
deficit would be a heritable biological trait. There is, then, no reason to suspect that 
gender would substantially affect performance on a passive-avoidance learning task.
Regardless, the limited research that does exist has been inconsistent or irrelevant. 
One study by Vitale and Newman (2001) found that psychopathy was not associated with 
behavioural disinhibition in women. The study, however, was not directly assessing the 
performance of women on the passive-avoidance learning task, and to that extent is 
irrelevant. Gremore, Chapman, and Farmer (2005) assessed passive-avoidance learning in 
female inmates and found results that were consistent with the research conducted with 
men.
Participant Recruitment. Recruitment of subjects took place through a number of 
sources as part of a larger study conducted at the University of Windsor. These sources 
included the University of Windsor Undergraduate Participant Pool, Windsor Regional 
Hospital, and a number of other community mental health organizations. The community 
resources provided potential participants with an information sheet detailing the study 
and the participants’ involvement. Upon handing out the information sheets, the 
individuals from the mental health treatment centres had no further involvement with any 
aspect of the research.
In addition to referrals from community treatment centres, posted flyers 
throughout the city indicated the purpose of the study, and contact information. These
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flyers were a source of self-referral to the study posted in public areas such as the 
University of Windsor campus, libraries, public offices, and retail establishments.
Demographic data in the form of age, sex, etc., are described below. All 
participants (clinical and community) were at least 18 years of age.
Tests and Materials
Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI) (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). The CPGI 
is a 129-item researcher administered interview. Of the 129-items answered by the 
participant, nine items are scored to produce a rating for degrees of gambling ranging 
from no problems with gambling to problem gambling. The CPGI consists of four 
primary dimensions: gambling involvement; problem gambling behaviour; adverse 
consequences; and problem gambling correlates. The items comprising the problem 
gambling behaviour and adverse consequences dimensions are scored (items Q75 to 
Q83). Each response, from item Q75 to Q83, is recoded into a numerical value (Never = 
0, Sometimes = 1, Most of the time = 2, Almost always - 3, Don’t know = 0, Refuse to 
answer = 0), and these numbers are then tabulated to calculate the total CPGI score 
(between 0 and 27).
Although the items in the gambling involvement and gambling correlates 
dimensions are not scored, the information provided by these items details the types of 
activities the gamblers engage in, the frequency of their play, the amount of money spent 
on different types of gambling behaviour, as well as the social and familial correlates that 
exist.
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Upon scoring the items, individuals completing the CPGI fall into one of five 
groups: non-gambling, non-problem gambling, low-risk gambling, moderate-risk 
gambling, and problem gambling.
1. Non-gambling. Score on CPGI = 0. The non-gambling group consists of 
those individuals who have not gambled within the previous 12 months and, 
with the exception of the correlates and demographic questions, will have no 
responses for the majority of the items.
2. Non-problem gambling. Score on CPGI = 0. This group likely responds with 
‘never’ to the behavioural problem indicators, although there is the 
possibility that there may be heavy monetary and time involvements. 
Gamblers presenting in this group will not have experienced many, if any, 
adverse consequences from their gambling and will not agree with the items 
assessing distorted cognitions.
3. Low-risk gambling. Score on CPGI = 1 to 2. Participants who score within 
this group will have responded ‘never’ to most of the behavioural problem 
items, but will still have one or more ‘sometimes’ or ‘most of the time’ 
responses. Although they may not have experienced any adverse 
consequences yet, they may be at risk if they are heavily involved in 
gambling and positively responded to at least two of the correlates questions.
4. Moderate-risk gambling. Score on CPGI = 3 to 7. Gamblers scoring within 
this group will have responded ‘never’ to most of the behavioural problem 
items, but will still have one or more ‘most of the time’ or ‘always’ 
responses. As with the previous group, gamblers may be at greater risk if
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they are heavily involved with gambling and have responded positively to 
three or four of the problem gambling correlates.
5. Problem gambling. Score on the CPGI = 8 or greater. Although involvement 
in gambling may be at any level, it is most likely to be quite heavy for 
individuals in this group. These gamblers will have experienced adverse 
consequences from their gambling, may have lost control of their behaviour, 
and will be much more likely to endorse the cognitive distortion items.
With respect to reliability, utilizing Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient, the 
CPGI had an alpha of 0.84, while the DSM-IV had an alpha of 0.76 when determining 
problem gambling. Upon retest, the CPGI had a test-retest reliability of 0.78 (Ferris & 
Wynne, 2001). Further, the criterion-related validity, or the accuracy with which the 
CPGI classifies participants using another measure as the reference point, is quite good 
with the DSM-IV, correlating at 0.83.
Within the present study, therefore, the PGs were those individuals who scored 
greater than 7.5 on this measure. These were individuals who regularly endorsed negative 
consequences associated with their gambling (e.g., significant loss of income, separation 
from family, etc.). These subjects, moreover, consistently endorsed those cognitive 
distortions identified as problematic, such as believing that gambling by a “system” will 
increase the chances of winning. The control subjects, on the other hand, while endorsing 
gambling behaviours, and possibly even some financial loss, did not have these same 
cognitive distortions, nor did they engage in those behaviours which would further 
negatively affect their lives as a result of gambling (e.g., committing crimes to get money 
to gamble).
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Stop Signal Paradigm (computer-based task). The stop signal paradigm is based 
on the work of Logan, et al. (1984). The basic paradigm involves a standard choice 
reaction time task in which the subject discriminates between an X and an O. For 
example, the subject is instructed to press the ‘ 1’ key if an X is presented on the computer 
screen. The subject is instructed to press the ‘3’ key, if the letter O appears on the screen. 
Subjects get feedback with respect to their accuracy: ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. On some of 
these trials, the subject is presented with a loud computer generated tone (stop-signal), 
telling them to stop their response to the primary discrimination reaction time task.
The entire task was on a computer. The subject sat before the monitor and was 
verbally described the task. Following the verbal description, written instructions were 
visible on the computer screen (Appendix A) and the participant completed a brief trial 
period to assure an understanding of what was required. The subject then completed three 
blocks of trials with a brief 10 second rest period between each block. Within each block, 
a small cross appeared in the middle of the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms) to orient the 
subject. The cross was followed by the presentation of the primary task stimulus for 5000 
ms, at which point the subject had 2500 ms to respond before the next trial.
Each block consisted of 144 trials, of which 25% (36 trials) included the stop- 
signal. The stop-signal was randomly presented at one of six different intervals (with six 
presentations of each interval) after the primary task stimulus: 5 ms, 100 ms, 200 ms, 300 
ms, 400 ms, and 500 ms. The most important data resulting from this task consisted of: 1) 
establishing if the subject was able to stop when told to (i.e., when the stop-signal 
sounds); and 2) the time it took for the subject to inhibit responding (stop-signal reaction 
time).
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Passive-Avoidance Learning Task (computer-based task). The passive-avoidance 
learning task, based on the work of Newman, et al. (1985), is a successive go/no-go 
discrimination task presented on the computer. The subject sat before the monitor and 
was verbally described the task. Following the verbal description, the participant 
reviewed a written version of the instructions on the computer monitor (Appendix B). 
This task consists of three conditions presented in the following order: punishment and 
reward (PALR), reward only (RRI), and punishment only (PANR). In each of the 
conditions participants learned through trial and error that four of eight numbers are 
“good”/S+ and four are “bad”/S-. The S+ numbers were those that required an active 
response (pressing the space bar) and the S- numbers were those that required a passive 
response (not pressing the space bar). Each condition involved a different set of randomly 
selected eight numbers (four S+, four S-) with each number presented eight times (64 
trials per condition, 192 total trials).
All of the numbers consisted of two digits, with no number repeated twice 
between conditions. In addition, all characteristics of the numbers (i.e., odd or even 
numbers, high or low numbers, numbers greater or less than 50, etc.) were differentially 
associated with either the S+ or S- numbers. For each trial, the stimulus number was 
presented for 2500 ms.
Through trial and error, participants were required to learn to press the spacebar 
when a S+ number appeared (active response), and not press the spacebar if a S- number 
appeared (passive response). For the PALR condition, participants received a reward, one 
dime, for a correct active response to an S+ only. Within this condition, they were also 
punished (lost a dime) for each incorrect active response to an S- (i.e., pressing spacebar
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for “bad” number). In the RRI condition, each time the participant made a correct active 
response to an S+ (i.e., pressing spacebar for “good” number), or a correct passive 
response to an S- (i.e., not pressing spacebar for “bad” number), they received a reward 
(one dime). There was no punishment of incorrect responses. In the final condition, 
PANR, participants only received punishments (losing a dime). Therefore, they were 
punished for not responding to S+ numbers (incorrect passive responses) and for 
responding to S- numbers (incorrect active responses). Both the reward and punishment 
consequences were administered immediately after the subject made a response.
Throughout the conditions, there were two types of errors: errors of commission 
(active responding to S-) and errors of omission (failing to respond to S+). Errors of 
commission are passive-avoidance errors in that they represent a failure to inhibit 
responding that result in punishment.
For the first task, every participant started with 10 dimes. As previously stated, 
rewarding added a dime while punishing removed a dime. Prior to beginning the research 
trials, participants were primed for reward by an initial successive presentation of each of 
the S+ numbers in the first condition. This priming was immediately followed by the 
PALR condition without a noticeable break in the presentation of trials. The second and 
third conditions began with the number of coins left over from the previous condition, 
and the rewards and punishments continued based on the task design. At the completion 
of the task, a tally was taken of the total number of dimes won and participants kept their 
winnings.
The purpose of the task was to determine if a subject, when presented with 
appropriate cues for responding or not responding (i.e., S+ and S-), was able to learn
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from previous experience of an anticipated reward, and was able to passively avoid 
responding (i.e., learning to withhold a response to get a reward rather than constantly 
responding in the hopes of a reward).
Procedure
Initial communication involved the potential subject contacting the researcher and 
indicating their interest in participating. At this point, they completed a brief telephone- 
screening questionnaire (Appendix C) to determine their suitability. During the initial 
contact with participants (i.e., during the telephone screen), individuals were presented 
with a verbal description of the study, told of the voluntary nature of the study, and told 
of their right to discontinue participation at any point. The researcher made note of verbal 
consent and signed that all procedures and expectations were disclosed. If a participant 
declined to consent, they were thanked for their time and no further contact was made.
The telephone interview was approximately 15 minutes in length and consisted of 
questions that assessed briefly for potential comorbid mood disorders, Axis II conditions, 
substance use/dependence, ADHD, eating disorders, and gambling problems. If the 
individual met inclusion criteria with respect to gambling problems and met all other 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, they were scheduled for a testing session. For the control 
group, individuals were included if they did not meet criteria for any Axis I disorder or 
Axis II disorder in the last 6  months, and met all other inclusion/exclusion criteria as 
detailed above.
For people who did not meet criteria, they were thanked for their time and 
informed that they were not accepted into the study. Some individuals did not clearly 
meet inclusion or exclusion criteria. These potential subjects were told that they would be
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contacted regarding their participation within 48 hours. Their information was discussed 
between the researcher and her supervisor, and a decision was made regarding the study.
Once deemed suitable, the subject had the study explained to them, as well as the 
limits of confidentiality, and right to withdraw without consequences. Following the 
verbal explanation, the subject was asked to read and sign the consent form; a copy of 
which they received for their own records (Appendix D). The testing session involved 
administering the Canadian Problem Gambling Index, the stop-signal paradigm computer 
task and the passive-avoidance learning task to the participant, as well as all other tasks 
included in the larger study (see Appendix E). All tasks were presented in random order 
to avoid administration and presentation effects. The clinical and non-clinical control 
groups were tested in the research lab of Dr. Stephen Hibbard, located in Chrysler Hall 
South, University of Windsor campus.
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Results
The following analyses did not include any statistical corrections for Type I error 
rate. Because of the small sample sizes and low power associated with a small N, a 
correction would exacerbate the problems of low power. Applying a correction would 
imply concern only for controlling the probability of a Type I error (rejecting the null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true), without thought to limiting the probability 
of a Type II error (accepting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false; Simon, 
2006).
Participant Characteristics
With respect to individual characteristics, 13 problem gamblers and 11 controls 
had a previous psychiatric or psychological diagnosis provided by another practitioner. 
There was no significant difference in the rate of diagnoses between the two groups,
^(1) = 0.005, p  = 0.94. Although none of the participants had a previous diagnosis of 
Problem Gambling, a number of subjects from both groups (20 problem gamblers, 14 
controls) acknowledged feeling depressed at some point in their lives. There was no 
significant difference in the rate of depression reported, x?(2) = 0.79,/? = 0.67.
There were some interesting significant differences between the two groups on a 
number of different gambling related variables. For example, 12 PGs bought lottery 
tickets at least once a month or greater, while 31 CTRLs purchased them less than once a 
month or never, y?Q) = 8.97,p  < 0.05. Similarly, nine PGs indicated they went to bingo 
once a month or more, and 11 others endorsed a slightly lower frequency of bingo 
playing, whereas 25 CTRLs stated they did not go to bingo at all, ^ (3) = 10.05,p  < 0.05. 
Finally, 14 PGs gambled with VLTs or slots at least once a month or greater (six of
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whom indicated playing the slots at least once a week) compared to 31 CTRLs who 
played the slotsA^LTs less than once a month or never, y?(3) = 12.95,/? < 0.01.
With respect to their experiences with, and beliefs about, gambling, PGs and 
CTRLs exhibited a number of significant differences. Within the sample, 14 PGs versus 7 
CTRLs indicated having a “big loss” when they first started gambling, ^(2 ) = 6.54, 
p  < 0.05; 24 PGs compared to 12 CTRLs had a “big win” when they first started 
gambling, y?(2) = 15.51,/? < 0.001; 18 PGs believed a strategy would increase their odds 
of winning while only nine CTRLs held that belief, y?(3) = 9.29, p  < 0.05; and, 20 PGs 
believed after losing a number of times in a row they were more likely to win, compared 
to only six CTRLs, X*(3) = 17.52,/? < 0.01.
In addition to their beliefs and experiences, PGs also endorsed a number of 
gambling related urges and problems that CTRLs did not. These significant differences 
included PGs having the urge to gamble if something bad were to happen [^(1) = 20.31, 
p  < 0.001], PGs were more likely to think about or attempt suicide as a result of gambling 
[%2(2) = 7.50,/? < 0.05], more PGs had family members with a gambling problem [^ (l)  = 
8.19,/? < 0.01], and PGs had experienced more difficulties as a result of someone else’s 
gambling [5̂ (2 ) = 6.51,/? < 0.05].
Finally, PGs and CTRLs differed significantly on the amount of time and money 
spent on all gambling activities, with PGs spending much more time, winning more 
money, and losing more money than the non-problem gambling comparison group (see 
Table 2). Overall, PGs were more likely to endorse those risk factors that have been 
associated with maintaining and exacerbating problem gambling behaviours (Ferris & 
Wynne, 2001).
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Table 2
Independent t-tests for Time and Money spent Gambling in past 12 months (N = 67)
Group M SD t d f
Cohen's
d






194.23 2.84 29.51*1 0.73a






2687.44 3.36 33.48*1 0 .8 6 a






585.62 3.66 29.28** 0.94a






194.46 3.49 29.01** 0.90a
* significant p < 0 .0 1  
1 equal variances not assumed 
a large effect size
The questions posed in this study were organized into three sections. Note, then, 
that the four main hypotheses stated on p.36 above are hereby addressed within the
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context of related but ancillary analyses. While we couch the central principles of the 
theories undergirding Logan’s theory and Newman’s theory in these four hypotheses, 
there are also ancillary related analyses that are worth following up on.
The first hypothesis (Hypothesis la, p.36) and supporting analyses focused on the 
stop-signal paradigm and the ‘stopping’ process. It was hypothesized that PGs would 
exhibit slower ‘stopping’ processes than CTRLs. In other words, for PGs, on those 25% 
of all the trials in which a stop-signal sound occurred, the PGs would be slower to inhibit 
their ‘go’ process than would CTRLs. To address this hypothesis, a Repeated Measures 
Analysis of Variance compared PGs and CTRLs on ‘stop’ times across the three blocks 
of the stop-signal task. In addition to providing overall group differences, and although 
no hypotheses were formulated directly relating to block effects or block by group 
interactions, examining the results by block would allow us to see if the various blocks 
themselves had any effect.
It was also hypothesized (Hypothesis lb, p.36) that PGs would not have a faster 
‘go’ process than CTRLs. Similar to the analysis above, and with the same rationale 
regarding possible block effects or interactions, a Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance compared PGs and CTRLs on ‘go’ times across the three blocks of the stop- 
signal task.
The remaining two hypotheses focus on the performance of PGs on the passive 
avoidance paradigm: 1) that PGs would have greater commission (passive-avoidance) 
errors than CTRLs on trials which have the possibility of both punishment and reward 
(PALR trials), and 2) that PGs would be as proficient as CTRLs when presented with 
reward only conditions or punishment only conditions. Analyses involved an Independent
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t-test to address Hypothesis 2a (p.36) comparing PGs and CTRLs on passive-avoidance 
errors. The second analysis was a Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance to examined 
type of error (commission versus omission) and type of consequence {PALR, RRI, PANR) 
for PGs and CTRLs (Hypothesis 2b, p.36).
Analysis 1: The ’stopping’process.
To begin, a review of the dataset identified instances of 11 cases with some 
missing data with respect to stopping times (SSRT0bs). Further examination of these cases 
showed two causes for the missing data: 1) responding on all, or almost all, trials (stop- 
signal and non-stop signal), and 2 ) correctly inhibiting all responses on stop-signal trials. 
That is, missing data was due to either near universal failure of stopping or near universal 
success in stopping.
For those subjects who responded to all (or nearly all) trials, these cases were 
further broken down into two categories: a) four subjects that were unable to inhibit their 
responding during experimental trials but correctly inhibited responses during practice 
trials; and, b) three subjects that did inhibit some responses, but not enough to meet 
mathematical requirements to determine the SSRT0bs value as detailed in the stop-signal 
paradigm literature. The remaining four cases with missing data fell into the second 
causal category: they inhibited all responses on stop-signal trials in a given block of 
trials.
Cases with missing data were included in the following analyses. In order to not 
lose subjects due to missing SSRT0bs data, various solutions to supply missing data were 
considered. One of the most obvious is to simply use the average from those cases for 
which the data are not missing. If the overall average is used, this completely washes out
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any contribution from group membership, whereas if group average is used, this tends to 
bias unreasonably in favour of the between groups difference. One alternative method is 
to use observed values of variables demonstrated to be related to the targeted missing 
values in order to estimate those missing values; but use values of these variables that are 
drawn across the whole sample, rather than separately for each group. Thus, some 
contribution due to group membership is maintained, since the related variables are 
themselves determined by group membership. In the present case, values on SSRT0bs 
were determined to be strongly related to commission errors3 on stop-signal trials and to 
non-stop signal reaction times (non-SSRT).
Therefore, using subjects for whom data was complete, three distinct regression 
equations were computed, predicting SSRT0bs from commission errors on stop-signal 
trials and from non-SSRT, for each block. These three equations were used to estimate 
values of SSRT0bs for each instance in which the data were missing on that variable. That 
is, missing Block 1 SSRT0bS values were estimated with an equation based on Block 1 
commission errors and Block 1 non-SSRT; missing Block 2 SSRT0bs values were 
estimated with an equation based on Block 2 commission errors and Block 2 non-SSRT; 
and missing Block 3 SSRT0bS values were estimated with an equation based on Block 3 
commission errors and Block 3 non-SSRT.
For Block 1, R for regression was significantly different from zero, F(2, 53) = 
32.65, p  < 0.001, with R2 at 0.65 and the adjusted R2 at 0.62. Block 2 R for regression was 
also significantly different from zero, F(2, 53) = 19.18,/? < 0.001, with R2 at 0.57 and the
3 The term “commission error” in the stop-signal task refers specifically to those errors made on trials with 
a stop-signal sound and should not be confused with the commission errors referenced in the Passive- 
avoidance paradigm.
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adjusted R at 0.54. Finally, for Block 3, R for regression was significantly different from 
zero, F(2, 53) = 69.05,p  < 0.001, with R2 at 0.72 and the adjusted R2 at 0.71. Altogether, 
65% (62% adjusted) of Block 1, 57% (54% adjusted) of Block 2, and 72% (71% 
adjusted) of Block 3 of the variability in SSRT0bs was predicted by number of 
commission errors on stop-signal trials and non-SSRT. Because these effect sizes are so 
large, use of these equations to estimate missing SSRT0bS values was regarded as 
preferable to simply substituting means for SSRT0bs.
To address the first hypothesis, a three (within subjects) by two (between groups) 
two-way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance was conducted, using stopping time 
across the three blocks of the study as the within-subjects variable and the two groups 
(PGs vs. CTRLs) as the between subject variables. This would provide information about 
the main effects of blocks, the main effects of groups, and any interaction between these 
two. A significant interaction would mean that Block 1, 2, or 3 or their pattern influenced 
mean stopping time (SSRT0bS) differently for the PGs than for the CTRLs. The results of 
this 3 x 2  analysis are diagrammed in Figure 3.
The main effect of blocks on the stopping time was nearly significant, F(2, 130) = 
2.51,p  -  0.08, ijp = 0.04. There was no significant interaction between group 
membership and block, F(2, 130) = 2.17,p  = 0.12, tjp2= 0.03, showing that any 
differences between the blocks were not moderated by group membership.
As predicted, there was a (marginally) significant difference between PGs and 
CTRLs, F (l, 65) = 3.79, p  = 0.056, tjp ^  0.06, indicating a difference between the two 
groups on SSRT0bs across the three blocks. For all three blocks, PGs had slower stopping 
times (Block 1: M SSRTobs = 340.32 ms, SD = 163.64; Block 2: M SSRTobs = 288.87 ms, SD =
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100.33; Block 3: MssRTobs = 319.00 ms, SD = 155.62) than CTRLs (Block 1: MssRTobs= 
276.57 ms, SD = 95.95; Block 2: MSSRTobs = 271.62 ms, SD = 102.42; Block 3: MssRTobs =  
251.82 ms, SD = 101.88) [see Figure 3: Mean Stopping Time (SSRT0bs) Across Blocks].
Figure 3











- ■ PGs 
— CTRLs
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
The effect sizes were large for Block 1 and for Block 3, while moderate for Block 
2. PGs stopping times were considerably slower than CTRLs on Block 1 and on Block 3. 
Effect sizes for the differences between the two groups across blocks are provided in 
Table 3. Because this finding was in the predicted direction with a two-tailed significance 
level p < 0.06, we interpreted it as confirming the hypothesis of slower stopping times for 
the PG group.
By comparison, means, standard deviations, and effect sizes, collapsed across 
blocks, were computed for those participants for whom there was originally complete 
SSRTobs data. For PGs, SSRT0bS across blocks was M Totai = 282.94, SD  = 85.74, and for
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CTRLs SSRTobs across blocks was MTotai = 248.31, SD = 67.88. The effect size for 
SSRTobs across blocks was Cohen’s d  = 0.44. These data were consistent in direction and 
size with that just reported which used the estimated values for SSRT0bs.
Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes o f Stopping Times (SSRTobs) (N = 67)
Block Group M SD Cohen’sd
1 Problem Gamblers 340.32 163.64
Non-problem Gamblers 276.57 95.95 0.48
2 Problem Gamblers 288.87 100.33
Non-problem Gamblers 271.62 102.42 0.17
3 Problem Gamblers 319.00 155.62
Non-problem Gamblers 251.82 1 0 1 .8 8 0.51
Total Problem Gamblers 316.03 124.62
Non-problem Gamblers 266.67 82.16 0.47
Given that the inhibitory response is known to be influenced by the offset from 
the ‘go’ signal, further Repeated Measures Analyses were performed based on the time of 
signal presentation following onset of the primary task presentation (sound delay; within- 
subject) by group (between-subjects). Although this is not directly related to the primary 
hypothesis of differences between the two groups on the stop-signal task, it would allow
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for an examination of whether the results of the present study are consistent with the 
literature and if the two groups might differ in the number of commission errors on stop- 
signal trials.
The analysis found a significant main effect for number of errors per sound delay, 
F{5, 325) = 119.37, p  < 0.001, rjp2= 0.65, with the greatest errors at sound delays of 500 
ms (Merrors ~ 13.48, SD = 4.63), followed by 400 ms (Menors = 10.91, SD -  5.61), 300 ms 
(M;rr0rs = 8.82, SD = 6.16), 200 ms (.Menors = 6.48, SD = 6.34), 100 ms (Merrors = 4.84, SD 
= 5.84), and 5 ms (Merrors = 4.13, SD = 5.45). This finding is to be expected and is almost 
universal in the stop-signal paradigm because the longer the stop-signal delay, the longer 
the response to the ‘go’ signal has had opportunity to develop to completion.
There was no significant interaction between group membership and the number 
of errors per sound delay, F(5, 325) = 0.53,/? = 0.75, rjp2= 0.01. There was also no main 
effect for group, indicating that differences in the number of commission errors between 
PGs {Merrors = 9.02, SD = 5.82) and CTRLs {Menors= 7.37, SD = 5.49) was not significant, 
F (l, 65) = 1.73,/? = 0.19, 77/ =  0.03 (see Figure 4: Stop-signal errors by sound delay). 
Figure 4
Stop-signal Errors by Sound Delay
14V
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Analysis 2: The ‘go ’process
As previously stated, this set of analyses looked to examine the differences 
between PGs and CTRLs on their ‘go’ processes, or their responses to the primary task. 
Given that the two processes, ‘stop’ and ‘go’ are hypothesized to be two independent 
processes, the ‘go’ process was not expected to be different for PGs and CTRLs.
To address this, a Repeated Measures, 3 (within-subjects) x 2 (between-groups) 
two-way Analysis of Variance was conducted, using ‘go’ reaction time across the three 
blocks of the study as the within-subjects variable and the two groups (PGs vs. non-PGs) 
as the between-subject variables. As with the analysis regarding stopping times, this 
would provide information about the main effects of blocks, the main effects of groups, 
and any interaction between these two. A significant interaction would mean that block 1, 
2, or 3 or their pattern influenced mean ‘go’ time (RT) differently for the PGs than for the 
CTRLs.
Tests of between-subjects found no significant difference between PGs and 
CTRLs, F(\, 65) = 0.13, p  = 0.72, rjp = 0.002. In addition, there was no main effect of 
blocks on the go time, F{2, 130) = 0.81,p  = 0.45, rjp = 0.012. Finally, there was no 
significant interaction between group membership and block, F(2, 130) = 0.57, p  = 0.57, 
rjp = 0.01, showing that any differences between the blocks were not moderated by group 
membership.
Although the logic of hypothesis testing does not allow us to affirm the null 
hypothesis (no group differences), the high observed p  value in this sample provides 
evidence to support the view that the two groups are not different in reaction time to the 
primary task.
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Analysis 3: Passive Avoidance Paradigm
As stated, the hypotheses regarding the passive-avoidance paradigm posit that 
PGs would have greater commission (passive-avoidance) errors (but not omission errors) 
than CTRLs on trials that have the possibility of both punishment and reward 
(PALR trials), and PGs would respond similar to CTRLs when presented with RRI 
conditions or PANR only conditions.
To determine if PGs committed more passive-avoidance errors than CTRLs on 
PALR trials as predicted, an Independent t-test was run based on this a priori hypothesis. 
Results did not show a significant difference between PGs (MpAerrors = 11.93, SD = 5.49) 
and CTRLs (MpAerrors = 10.06, SD = A.19 on the number of passive-avoidance errors 
committed on PALR trials, t(66) = 1.49,p  = 0.12, two-tailed. There was a medium effect 
size, however, Cohen’s d  = 0.37, which suggests that perhaps the hypothesized effect was 
not observed because of lack of power. Effect sizes did not indicate similar performance 
for omission errors on the reward/punishment trials (see Table 4 for all means, standard 
deviations, and effect sizes). A 2 (error type) x 1 (consequence type) x 2 (group) planned 
comparison of omission versus commission errors on the PALR trials for PGs and CTRLs 
was also conducted. The main effect for error type was nearing significance on the 
reward/punishment trials, F (l, 66) = 2.89,/? = 0.08, ijp2= 0.04. There was no significant 
interaction for error type by group, F (l, 66) = 1.14,/? = 0.30, rjp2= 0.02.
To examine the performance of PGs and CTRLs further, a mixed two (type of 
error; i.e., commission error or omission error) by three (consequence type; i.e., PALR, 
RRI, PANR) Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance was conducted to determine if type 
of error and/or type of consequence varied by group membership. This analysis would
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begin to identify if, and in what way, PGs and CTRLs differed in their performance on 
the passive-avoidance task (hypothesis 2b).
To begin, the three-way interaction for group by error type by consequence was 
not significant, F(2,128) = 0.45, p  = 0.64, rjp =0.01. This means that there was no effect 
predicated on simultaneous moderation of any two of the variables. There was no two- 
way interaction between type of error and group membership, F (l, 64) = 0.14, p = 0.71, 
rip = 0.002, indicating that group membership did not influence the difference between 
commission versus omission errors. Similarly, there was no two-way interaction between 
consequence type and group membership, F(2, 128) = 0.26,/? = 0.77, t jp2 = 0.004, 
showing that group membership also did not determine any differences in performance 
based on the three different types of consequences for error versus success.
The interaction between type of error and consequence type, however, is 
significant, F(2, 128) = 8.65,/? < 0.001, r/p -  0.12. As indicated in Figure 5 and Table 4, 
the difference between commission and omission errors is greatest on reward only trials 
and least on mixed consequence trials. Examination of the columns in Table 4 depicting 
cell means by error type reveals an interesting data point; namely, the rate of commission 
errors ascends monotonically across the mixed, punishment, and reward conditions, 
whereas rate of omission errors does the opposite, descending monotonically. Group does 
not moderate this effect. The greatest numbers of commission errors on the reward only 
trials is consistent with the literature in that the possibility of reward increases the 
likelihood of responding. This task makes it explicit that there is no possibility of 
punishment, thereby possibly increasing the proclivity to respond as opposed to inhibiting 
(therefore, less omission errors). The presentation of the tasks, with the punishment only
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task following the reward/punishment and reward only tasks, may have created a 
responding or commission response set which was somewhat resistant to change, similar 
to that in the reward/punishment task; again resulting in greater responding.
Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations and Effect Sizes across Type o f Trial and Consequence (N = 66)
Commission Errors Omission Errors




Problem Gamblers 11.93 5.49 9.07 6.76
Non-problem Gamblers 10.06 4.79 0.37 8.89 6.16 0.03
Total 10.91 5.16 8.97 6.39
2. Punishment Only Trials
Problem Gamblers 12.70 6.09 7.33 4.67
Non-problem Gamblers 10.94 5.88 0.29 5.72 4.30 0.36
Total 11.74 6.00 6.45 4.51
3. Reward Only Trials
Problem Gamblers 13.03 6.24 6.70 6.40
Non-problem Gamblers 12.22 6.71 0.12 5.56 4.36 0.21
Total 12.59 6.47 6.08 5.37
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With respect to the main effects, there was a significant main effect for type of 
error, F (l, 64) = 46.48,/? <  0.001, tjp  = 0.42, with more commission errors (Merrors =
11.82, SD = 5.89) than omission errors (Merrors = 7.21, SD = 5.48). Using rjp2 as the 
measure of association, type of error (commission or omission) accounted for 42% of the 
total variability in accuracy rate. Results of the analysis showed no significant main effect 
for total number of errors across type of tasks, F(2, 128) = 1.18, p = 0.31, rjp = 0.02, 
indicating there was no significant difference between the number of errors on 
reward/punishment (Merrors = 9.94, SD = 5.78), punishment only (Merrors = 9.10 SD = 
5.25), and reward only (Merrors = 9.34, SD = 5.92) trials.
Figure 5
Number o f  Commission and Omission Errors by Task
E3 Commission 
errors
^  Omission 
errors
PALR PANR RRI
For overall between group effects, the difference between PGs and CTRLs 
collapsed across error type and consequence type, was not significant, F( 1, 64) = 2.13, 
p = 0.15, Jjp = 0.03. Results of these analyses are presented in Table 5, means and 
standard deviations are listed in Table 4.
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When further examining the performance of PGs and CTRLs on this task (see 
Table 5), the two groups do not appear to differ on the number of omission errors or on 
Table 5
Mixed Repeated Measures ANOVA for Group by Error Type by Consequence -  
Main effects and Interactions (N = 66)
M SD F d f P Vp
Interactions
Error type x Consequence x Group 0.45 2,128 0.64 0.01
Error type x Consequence 8.65 2, 128 <0.001 0.12
Consequence x Group 0.26 2,128 0.77 0.004
Error type x Group 0.14 1,64 0.71 0.002
Main Effects
Error type 46.48 1,64 <0.001 0.42
Commission Errors 11.82 5.89
Omission Errors 7.21 5.48
Consequence 1.18 2, 128 0.31 0.02
Reward/Punishment Trials 9.94 5.78
Punishment Only Trials 9.10 5.25
Reward Only Trials 9.34 5.92
Problem Gamblers vs. Controls 2.13 1,64 0.15 0.03
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the number of commission errors on the reward only task. The Cohen’s d  values do 
suggest, however, that the two groups may perform differently on the punishment only 
tasks. That is, there are medium effect sizes for omission errors and commission errors 
for PGs versus CTRLs on the punishment only task with PGs having a greater number of 
errors. This is in contrast to the expectation that the PGs and CTRLs mean errors would 
not differ on all other conditions (e.g., everything except passive avoidance errors on 
reward/punishment trials).
As previously reported, the order of the tasks, with the punishment only task 
following the reward/punishment and reward only tasks, may have created a responding 
or commission response set which was somewhat resistant to change and the PGs may be 
more prone to this resistance than the CTRLs.
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Discussion
The objective of this study was to apply and analyze the passive-avoidance 
learning model and the stop-signal paradigm to problem gamblers. Both of these models 
have been empirically studied with various impulse-related disorders, and have illustrated 
a number of cognitive and motor processes associated with disinhibition.
The analyses recounted above followed the sequence presented in the hypotheses. 
The first set of analyses, therefore, looked at the stop-signal task and the performance of 
the problem gamblers compared to controls. It was hypothesized that PGs would have 
slower stopping processes compared to the CTRL group. This position was originally 
presented and supported by the research of Logan, et al, with AD/HD children (e.g., 
Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984; Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 
1997.).
As the model posits, and research has subsequently supported (see above 
references), all individuals are more likely to stop a response that has already started if a 
signal to stop comes closely after the initial task onset signal. The results of the current 
study are also consistent with this portion of the model. When this condition is met, and 
responses are not inhibited, the literature suggests one of two causes: 1) the individual is 
responding too slowly to the ‘stop’ signal even though the ‘go’ response is comparable 
within normal limits, or 2) the individual is responding too quickly to the ‘go’ signal.
The first cause, 1) above, is what the researchers have found in their studies of 
children with AD/HD. In other words, when compared to non-AD/HD controls, 
the AD/HD group did not have significantly faster response times on a forced 
choice task. In fact, the AD/HD group often had slower RTs on the primary ‘go’
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling 68
task, as well, although this feature is not always noted. Consistently, however, the 
AD/HD group did exhibit slower responses to the stop-signal (Logan, Schachar, 
& Tannock, 1997). The present study extended this finding to the sample of PGs 
vs. CTRLs: across the three blocks of stop-signal trials, the PGs were reliably 
slower than CTRLs, as predicted.
The second of the causes of disinhibition, that the individual is responding too 
quickly to the ‘go’ signal, was the basis of the next hypothesis: PGs would not have a 
faster ‘go’ response time. The work of Logan, et al, states that it is not a faster response 
time on the primary task that is responsible for disinhibition in AD/HD children but, 
rather, a slower ‘stopping’ time. It was expected, therefore, that a faster ‘go’ process 
would not be present in PGs. This was, in actuality, the case. Not only were PGs and 
CTRLs not significantly different in their respective ‘go’ RTs, PGs were actually, on 
average, somewhat slower than CTRLs on the primary go task, although not significantly 
slower.
The somewhat slower ‘go’ RT of the PGs could also help explain the similar 
number of commission errors for the two groups. In other words, while a slower stopping 
time would, in most instances, result in a corresponding increase in the number of 
commission errors (PGs had a slightly, though not significant, greater number of errors 
than CTRLs), the associated slower ‘go’ time would decrease the number of overall 
errors, as seen with the PGs.
Important is the similarity in presentation between PGs and the AD/HD children 
with whom the stop-signal paradigm was originally developed. One of the objectives of 
this study was to ascertain if other impulse-related disorders would have comparable
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presentations on previously researched and supported models. This study, then, aids in 
clarifying motor and cognitive disinhibition in another diagnostic group. That is, the PGs 
in this study, like AD/HD children, are disinhibited not by their excessive or rapid 
responding to a go task. The deficit lies in their ability to shift from starting a response to 
stopping the response once the “normally” paced ‘go’ response is set in motion. As 
previously suggested, the stop-signal task establishes a dominant ‘go’ task in which the 
need to ‘go’ is so strong that the processing of any secondary direction (like ‘stop’) is 
impaired. As a result, there is a deficit in inhibitory control.
The passive-avoidance learning paradigm attempts to explain (dis)inhibitory 
processes in another impulse-related group: psychopaths. The research by Newman, et 
al., (e.g., Newman, 1987; Newman & Kosson 1986; Patterson & Newman, 1993) puts 
forth the idea that, for psychopaths and extroverts, the possibility of reward results in 
over-responding or the inclination to respond. In addition, there is a resistance to change 
behaviours regardless of actual or probable punishment. As a result, when rewards, or the 
possibility of rewards, are present, if an individual is punished, s/he is even more prone to 
responding with a greater disregard for the negative consequences. In other words, 
psychopaths lack response modulation because of their limited or non-existent 
consideration of behaviours or negative consequences when the possibility for reward 
exists. They do not learn from aversive events.
Based on this model, it was expected that PGs, like psychopaths, would not 
withhold responding under conditions where they could receive both rewards and 
punishments, and have a greater number of commission errors (passive-avoidance errors) 
than CTRLs. The results of the present study suggested a difference between the two
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groups in number of passive-avoidance errors: the effect size was moderate. Cohen’s d = 
0.37, and in the predicted direction, that is, the problem gambling group had a greater 
number of passive-avoidance errors than the control group. This difference is sufficient to 
warrant further investigation, perhaps with a larger sample size. Consistent with the work 
of Newman, et al., the suggestion did exist that the PGs in this sample were comparable 
to psychopaths and extroverts on this task.
Extrapolated from the septal-hippocampal lesion model by Gray, this tendency to 
over respond in the face of both reward and punishment may be related to the 
exaggerated influence of reward. Although still only a suggestion, future study with a 
greater sample size may find that, following the model, any possibility of reward for the 
PGs produces an emotional/motivational state which, according to Gray, is related to the 
behavioural activation system (BAS), and results in both over-responding and an inability 
to shift response sets. When punishment or non-reward is presented, the PGs experience 
even greater arousal which, unlike with the CTRLs, results in even greater responding as 
opposed to response modulation.
The theory, however, goes on to state that, when there is only one type of 
consequence possibility (e.g., either reward or punishment but not both), this proclivity to 
over-respond or ignore consequence is not present since the individuals are not required 
to shift response sets (between avoidance and approach). The study results show that the 
two groups did not differ in commission or omission errors on the reward only task. On 
the punishment only task, however, PGs appeared to have a greater number of total errors 
than CTRLs. This result may be explained by the presentation of tasks within the study. 
The punishment only task was the third task completed after the reward/punishment and
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reward only tasks. The PGs, based on Newman, et al’s model, had an approach response 
set develop and become strengthened over the course of the previous two trials, making it 
more difficult for them to then shift to not responding.
As with the stop-signal task, the performance of PGs on the passive-avoidance 
learning task is a step towards linking problem gamblers in this study to the psychopaths 
upon whom this model was first developed. The PGs in this study, like the previously 
studied clinical populations, are possibly disinhibited in that they are not reflective upon 
negative consequences to moderate behaviours if the possibility of reward also exists. 
When both reward and punishment are likely, the PGs have difficulty shifting from 
dominant reward-seeking responses to punishment prevention. In situations with 
punishment only or reward only (e.g., non-competing response sets), the PGs in this 
study do not present with this deficit. Again, the results of this study help meet the 
objective of connecting two distinct impulse-related disorders with an objective measure 
of behavioural and motivational aspects of disinhibition.
Overall, the results of this study have shown that the disinhibition manifest in the 
PGs is not due to faster or indiscriminate responding compared to the control group. In 
fact, PGs are slower to even begin responding to the primary task. Their deficits are 
likely to be found in their unsuccessful ability to shift between a ‘go’ response that has 
already started and a secondary signal which negates the first, telling them to stop. It is 
not that they do not hear this signal to stop, but that they are slower (than controls) in 
their ability to stop their response from happening.
Secondly, the influence of consequences is also varied for PGs. Unlike 
assumptions that PGs do not learn from negative consequences, their difficulty in
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inhibiting themselves is more apparent in situations where the possibility of a positive 
consequence is also present. In other words, knowing that a reward might be coming to 
them, PGs are emotionally/motivationally aroused to seek out that reward and are less 
likely to pay attention to the effects of a negative consequence/punishment, resulting in 
disinhibited behaviours such as indiscriminate gambling despite significant losses. If, 
however, there is no competition of consequences, if the PGs know they will only be 
rewarded and do not have to worry about a punishment, they are no more disinhibited 
than anyone else. A reward only (or a punishment only) possibility does not result in 
over-responding or indiscriminate actions.
Clinical Implications
In terms of clinical issues, Cummings and Gambino (1992) asked a group of 75 
clinicians those dimensions considered important in the treatment of gambling problems. 
The paper detailed five main clusters identified by the clinicians as important to 
treatment: self-help/social support, crisis interventions, behavioural resources for change, 
psychodynamics of treatment, and crisis severity. Maurer (1994) has also reported the 
sincerity of the gambler’s motivation for change as important to treatment efficacy.
In addition to the complexities inherent in treatment and diagnosing are the 
differences of opinion on what constitutes the appropriate treatment goals for problem 
gambling: abstinence versus controlled gambling. Abstinence proponents believe in the 
disease model of addictions and that, as an addiction, gambling cannot be cured, only 
arrested (Schwarz & Lindner, 1992). As a treatment goal, controlled gambling offers the 
advantage of appealing to gamblers who believe they would not be able to fully abstain 
from the problem behaviour. In addition, early success with controlled gambling would
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have the benefit of increasing self-efficacy, possibly resulting in the gambler more 
readily accepting the idea of later abstinence (Ladouceur, 2005).
Cognitive theories of gambling posit that problem behaviours are maintained by 
erroneous beliefs or perceptions (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996). These erroneous beliefs 
include having the ability to predict outcome and having control over the game while 
excluding the idea of chance, and these need to be addressed in treatment. Cognitive 
treatments have differed in their goals with some aiming for controlled gambling while 
others focus on abstinence. For example, a social learning model based approach would 
have the gamblers learn the relationship between their emotions and gambling 
behaviours, how to effectively manage emotions, and return to appropriate social 
gambling (Sylvain & Ladouceur, 1992). In addition, treatment emphasizes an awareness 
of the variables influencing behaviours, learning self-management skills, and recognizing 
negative emotional states (Das, 1990).
Psychodynamic treatments, also with a treatment goal of controlled gambling, 
include intensive psychotherapy with an emphasis on finding the meaning behind, and 
consequences of, gambling behaviours (Rosenthal, 1992). This treatment focuses on the 
patient’s omnipotence, confusion over boundaries, idealization of destructiveness, and 
lying. The effects of financial and interpersonal losses are considered in detail, and 
challenges are made to the compulsion to live within a fantasy world. Within the 
therapeutic relationship, work is centred on the realization and symbolization of early 
childhood dependence and the therapist’s task is to encourage the transformation from 
financial gamble to emotional vulnerability (Whitman-Raymond, 1988).
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Conversely, the abstinence proponents, such as Gamblers Anonymous (GA), 
believe the only treatment goal is to take responsibility for the gambling behaviours and 
stop gambling (Schwarz & Lindner, 1992). The four factors for success in GA include: 
identifying oneself as a gambler, relying on the support of the group, spirituality, and 
relabelling oneself. As with other 12-step programs, GA involves variations of the 
following: admitting being powerless over gambling; believing in a greater power; 
considerable self-reflection on thoughts, feelings and actions; and, making amends to 
others who have been harmed by the gambling.
According to Custer (1982), GA is successful for the following reasons: it 
demands honesty and responsibility; is non-judgemental; undercuts projection, 
rationalization, and denial; gives affection, personal support and concern; develops 
substitutes for the void left by no longer gambling; identifies serious implications of 
gambling; and identifies and corrects character deficits.
The present study, however, has identified other components of disinhibited 
behaviours in gambling which may be relevant to the treatment of gambling and can be 
incorporated to the treatments mentioned above. For example, on a behavioural level, the 
study has identified that, like AD/HD children, the gamblers in this study are not rapid 
responders, but are delayed in their stopping of a response that has already started. Within 
a social learning or cognitive-behavioural model, this awareness could be used to tailor 
the type of self-management skills which need to be taught.
Similarly, the gamblers in this study also have comparable behaviours to 
psychopaths in learning from rewards and punishments. Recognizing the deficits in 
learning from punishment if reward is also present would alter the course of teaching
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behaviour management skills and countering erroneous beliefs and perceptions. It may 
then be beneficial to address the emotional or motivational arousal experienced by 
gamblers related to a physiological response. With an identified physiological response 
biological approaches to treatment, such as medications, can be considered.
In relation to presentation similar to other groups researched in greater depth, 
applying the treatments and interventions found to be helpful with these other groups 
may be an appropriate treatment avenue with gamblers as well. Most important to note, 
however, is the understanding that gamblers, as with other diagnostic groups, vary in the 
etiology of the problem, the factors which maintain the behaviours, and the impact of 
treatment. Because of the diversity of and within problem gamblers the treatment 
programs available should be equally varied to meet the needs of this population. 
Limitations and Future Research
One of the more apparent limitations in this study was the relatively small sample 
size of problem gamblers and controls. With only 30 gamblers and 37 controls, a number 
of analyses showed nearing statistical significance, while the effect sizes for these same 
analyses were in the medium to large range. As such, future research on disinhibition and 
problem gambling would benefit from an even larger sample of moderate to serious 
problem gamblers and non-problem gambling controls. In addition, while stop-signal 
research has shown no gender differences or differences between younger and older 
adults, this data is not as clearly available for the passive-avoidance learning paradigm. 
Future research may need to pay closer attention to age and gender makeup of the various 
experimental and control groups.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling 76
Researchers, however, would do well to consider the difficulties inherent in not 
only recruiting subjects, but also screening for those subjects that meet research criteria. 
While a number of potential participants referred to the study subjectively felt or believed 
that they had a problem with gambling or were concerned about their gambling 
behaviours, these participants did not always meet research criteria according to the 
CPGI. For example, the CPGI addresses not only gambling behaviours (e.g., frequency of 
gambling, different types of gambling involvement), but also assesses for the distorted 
cognitions and adverse consequences associated with problem gambling (e.g., go back 
another day to win back losses; steal or sell things to fund gambling). For some 
individuals, while there may be heavy monetary expenditure or time involvement, they 
do not experience many, if any, adverse consequences from their gambling and will not 
agree with items that assess distorted cognitions.
Related to the idea of proper diagnosis is also that of definition. There is still 
considerable variety in the definition of problem gambling which, in turn, influences the 
measurement of the ill-defined construct. As a result, a heterogeneous group of gamblers 
are often combined into one group and one study (such as this) while they manifest the 
various dimensions of gambling in many different ways.
In addition to the difficulties inherent in recruiting a suitable sample, and defining 
what a suitable sample consists of, there were also some concerns with the administration 
of the measures themselves. As the tasks were computerized, instructions were given on 
the computer and were verbally provided by the research assistant running the subject. 
Following the written and verbal instructions, practice trials were run prior to the start of 
the actual research trials. For example, on the stop-signal task, the primary task was to
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respond to an ‘X’ or an ‘0 ’ with a ‘ 1’ or a ‘3’, respectively. If a sound was presented, the 
subject was told to withhold the response.
Before beginning the research trials, the subject had the opportunity to practice 20 
trials with and without sound. During this time, the research assistant was observing the 
subjects’ responses to assess if they were, in fact, inhibiting the response when there was 
a sound, or displaying some nonverbal or verbal feedback at being aware that they have 
not withheld a response when they should have. It was found, however, that there were 
some participants who did not comprehend the task requirements, and did not follow 
through with the instructions. As a result, these subjects’ data were not included in the 
analyses.
Finally, the results of the present study have shown some interesting relationships 
between motor and cognitive disinhibition and problem gambling. Future research that 
includes other diagnostic groups also characterized as “impulsive” will help to further 
clarify the manifestation of motor and cognitive disinhibition across a greater number of 
disorders, helping to refine diagnoses and diagnostic criteria. This refinement, in turn, 
will help to guide both the research on, and treatment of, these disorders. The direct 
application of these models to problem gambling has started the process of unifying the 
presentation of disinhibition across a number of diagnoses.
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APPENDIX A
Written instructions for Stop-signal task (computer-based task)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. The purpose of this study is to determine how quickly you can respond to a 
stimulus while also measuring accuracy. You will be presented with two different 
stimuli: an ‘X’ and an ‘O’.
2. For this study, you will first see a plus sign (+) in the middle of the screen.
3. Immediately after this you will see either the letter ‘X’ or the letter ‘O’
When you see the letter ‘X’, hit the ‘ 1 ’ key as quickly as you can.
When you see the letter ‘O’, hit the ‘3’ key as quickly as you can.
HOWEVER, if you hear a sound after the letter, DO NOT hit either of the keys. 
Do not wait for the sound since it will not occur after each letter.
Remember, we want to see how quickly and accurately you respond.
4. Before we begin, find the number ‘ 1 ’ key and the number ‘3’ key on the keypad 
which is on the right hand side of the keyboard. Place your left pointer finger in 
the ‘ 1’ key and your right pointer finger on the ‘3’ key.
5. Press any key to begin a practice trial.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRACTICE TRIAL 1
1. For this practice trial, you will first see a plus sign (+) in the middle of the screen.
2. Immediately after this you will see either the letter ‘X’ or the letter ‘O’.
3. When you see the letter ‘X’, hit the ‘ 1’ key (left finger) as quickly as you can.
4. When you see the letter ‘O’, hit the ‘3’ key (right finger) as quickly as you can.
5. Press any key to continue with the practice trial.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRACTICE TRIAL 2
1. For this practice trial, you will first see a plus sign (+) in the middle of the screen.
2. Immediately after this you will see either the letter ‘X’ or the letter ‘O’.
3. When you see the letter ‘X’, hit the ‘ 1’ key (left finger) as quickly as you can.
4. When you see the letter ‘O’, hit the ‘3’ key (right finger) as quickly as you can.
5. HOWEVER, if you hear a sound after the letter, DO NOT hit either of the keys.
6. Do not wait for the sound since it will not occur after each letter. Remember, we 
want to see how quickly and accurately you respond.
7. Before we begin, find the number ‘ 1 ’ key and the number ‘3’ key on the keypad 
which is on the right hand side of the keyboard. Place your left pointer finger on 
the ‘ 1 ’ key and your right pointer finger on the ‘3’ key.
8. Press any key to begin the practice trial.
INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE BEGINNING STUDY TRIALS
1. You have now completed the practice trials and are about to begin the study. You 
will be asked to complete these trials in the same way as the ones you just did.
2. In between sets of trials, you will see a blue screen. Continue to watch the screen 
until the next trial begins.
3. If you are ready to begin the study, please hit any key now.
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APPENDIX B
Written instructions for Passive-avoidance task (computer-based task)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE BEGINNING TASK
1. The purpose of this study is to determine how quickly you can respond to a 
stimulus while also measuring accuracy. You will be presented with one of eight 
different numbers.
2. If you choose to respond to a number, hit the zero ‘0’ key as quickly as possible. 
If you choose not to respond do not hit anything.
3. Press any key to begin.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR TASK 1
1. For this next set of trials, you will be presented with one of eight different 
numbers.
2. Some of these numbers are “good” numbers and some these numbers are “bad” 
numbers. For the “good” numbers, if you hit the zero ‘O’ key you will get a 
reward, 10 cents. For the “bad” numbers, if you hit the zero ‘O’ key you will lose 
10 cents.
3. Your task is to learn which numbers are “good” and which ones are “bad”.
4. Press any key to begin.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR TASK 2
1. For the next set of trials, you will be presented with a different set of eight 
numbers from last time.
2. On these trials, you will get a reward (10 cents) when you respond to the “good” 
numbers, AND, you will also get a reward when you do not respond to the “bad” 
numbers. You will not lose any money for an incorrect response.
3. Press any key to begin.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR TASK 3
1. For the next set of trials, you will be presented with another different set of eight 
numbers.
2. On these trials, you will lose 10 cents when you do not respond to the “good” 
numbers, AND, you will also lose 10 cents when you do respond to the “bad” 
numbers. You will not win any money for a correct response.
3. Press any key to begin.
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APPENDIX C 
Mechanisms of Impulsivity Telephone Screen 
Participant ID number (to be assigned at lab appt):________________________
Rapport: (This element can be phrased in any way the research assistant finds 
comfortable and accommodating to the needs of the caller and researcher.) Thanks very 
much for calling. I hope you didn’t have a hard time reaching us. I’m so glad we could 
have a chance to talk. You know that we are going to be collecting some data on 
processes of disinhibition. Can I ask how you were referred to the study?
REFERRAL SOURCE:______________________________________________
(if from poster, where did they see/get it?________________________________ )
Most likely group into which this person will be recruited:___________________
Consent to diagnostic aspects of phone interview: I am going to need to ask you 
some specific questions about problems you may or may not have had in the past, or may 
currently have. Many of these questions are about people with various kinds of emotional 
problems and so they may make you feel uncomfortable to a certain extent. Of course, 
you don’t have to answer these questions, but in order to determine whether you are 
suitable for our study, I need to ask them. If you don’t want to proceed, this will in no 
way jeopardize any treatment you might be getting from the people who referred you. It’s 
just that I need to ask you the questions and some people get uncomfortable about being 
asked questions about their emotional life. Is that going to be alright with you? (If the 
person indicates that it is alright to proceed then do so. The interviewer is at liberty to 
field further questions from the potential participant at this point about whether there are 
any penalties for not participating, how long it will take, etc.)
Indicate: YES, the interviewee consents_______
NO, the interviewee declines further participation_______
Any notes relevant to informed consent:
Let’s get started. Remember, if by any chance you become so uncomfortable that you 
need to talk about it, just let me know. If you feel it’s necessary to do so, we can call the 
whole thing off at any time and there will be no penalty to you.
Diagnostic Portion of the Interview: (Based on Structured Clinical Interview for DSM -  
IV Axis I Disorders, Clinician Version; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997)
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Circle ‘ 1 ’ if there is no indication of a problem
Circle ‘2’ if unsure or if there is some indication of a problem
Circle ‘3’ if it is likely that there is a problem or definitely a problem
1. a) How old are you?________  What is your date of birth?___________
1. b) Have you ever been diagnosed by a physician, therapist, psychiatrist or 
psychologist?___________________________________________________
1. c) Have you been given any other diagnoses?_________________________
1. d) Have you ever had a head injury?_________________________________
Depression
2. a) Has there ever been a time in your life when you were feeling
depressed or down most of the day, nearly every day? 1 2  3
2. b) IF YES: What was that like?____________________________________
(check if they mention any of the following symptoms)
 subjective report (i.e., feeling sad or empty)




2. c) How long did that last?______________   check if at least 2 weeks
2. d) Has there ever been a period of time in your life when you lost
interest or pleasure in things you usually enjoyed? 1 2  3
2. e) How long did it last?_______________  check if at least 2 weeks
2. f) If there is indication of depressive episode:
How many separate times in your life have you been depressed (USE OWN 
WORDS) nearly everyday for at least two weeks?
________________number of episodes
2. g) In the last month have been feeling depressed?_____________________
Are you currently depressed?_____________________________________
Bipolar Disorder
3. a) Has there ever been a time in your life when you were feeling
so good, high, excited, or hyper that other people thought you 
were not your normal self or you were so hyper you got into 
trouble? (did anyone say you were manic?) (was that more
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than just feeling good?)
3. b) IF NO: What about a period of time when you were feeling so 
irritable that you found yourself shouting at people or starting 
fights or arguments? 1
3. c) IF YES (to either 3a or 3b): How long did (USE OWN WORDS) last?
If at least 1 week check here_____
Did you have to go into hospital?___________________________
Substance Abuse
4. a) Are you taking an medications or vitamins?_______________
4. b) IF YES: What medications? (get specific names)
How often do you take them?
What dosages? (if unable to remember dosage, ask to write down 
to bring in on day of testing)
4. c) Has there been any time in your life when you had five or more 
drinks (beer, wine, or liquor) on one occasion?
4. d) Have you ever been told that you have a drinking problem?__
4. e) IF YES: By whom?
How long have you been drinking? 
What do you usually drink?______
How much do you usually drink during one session? 
Do you ever drink more than you planned?________
4. f) Have you ever used street drugs?
4. g) Have you ever been told that you have drug problem?
4. h) IF YES: By whom?___________________________
How long have you been doing drugs? 
What drugs do/did you usually take?_
4. i) Have you ever gotten ‘hooked’ on a prescribed medicine or 
taken a lot more of it than you were supposed to?
4. j) IF YES: What drugs do/did you usually take?__________
How much do/did you usually take?___________
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Anxiety
5. a) Have you ever had a panic attack, when you suddenly felt 
frightened or anxious or suddenly developed a lot of physical 
symptoms? 1 2 3
5. b) Were you ever afraid of going out of the house alone, being 
in crowds, standing in a line, or traveling on buses or trains? 1 2 3
5. c) Is there anything that you have been afraid to do like 
speaking, eating or writing? 1 2 3
5. d) Have you ever been bothered by thoughts that didn’t make 
any sense and kept coming back to you even when you 
tried not to have them? 1 2 3
5. e) IF YES: What were they?________________________________
When you had these thoughts, did you try hard to get them out of
your head?_____________________________________________
What did you do to try and stop them?______________________
5. f) Was there ever anything that you had to do over and over 
again and couldn’t resist doing, like washing your hands 
again and again, counting up to a certain number, or 
checking something several times to make sure that you’d 
done it right? 1 2 3
5. g) IF YES: What did you do?____________________________________________
Why did you have to do it?_____________________________________
What would happen if you didn’t do it?___________________________
5. h) In the last six months, have you been particularly nervous
or anxious? 1 2  3
Eating Disorders
6. a) Have you ever had a time when you weighed much less
than other people thought you ought to weigh? 1 2  3
6. b) IF YES: How much did you weigh?_____________________________________
How old/tall were you?_______________________________________
Were you trying to lose weight because you thought you were fat?
6. c) Have you often had times when your eating was out of control? 1 2  3
6. d) IF YES: During these times, do you often eat within a two hour time period
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what most people would regard as an unusual amount? (Tell me about it)
Did you do anything to counteract the effects of eating that much? 
What was it?
Eight Gambling Screen (Sullivan, 2001)
7. a) Have you ever felt depressed or anxious after a session of
gambling? NO YES
7. b) Have you ever felt guilty about the way you gamble? NO YES
7. c) Has gambling ever caused you problems? NO YES
7. d) Have you found it better to not tell others, especially your family
about the amount of time or money you spend gambling? NO YES
7. e) Have you often found that when you stop gambling it is
because you ran out of money? NO YES
7. f) Do you ever get the urge to return to gambling to win back
losses from a past session? NO YES
7. g) Have you ever received criticism about your gambling in the
past? NO YES
7. h) Have you tried to win money to pay debts? NO YES
Borderline Personality Disorder (Based on Structured Clinical Interview for DSM -  IV
Axis II Personality Disorders, Clinician Version; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, &
Benjamin, 1997)
8. a) Have you often become frantic when you thought that
someone you really cared about was going to leave you? NO YES
8. b) Do your relationships with people you really care about have
extreme ups and downs? NO YES
8. c) Have you all of a sudden changed your sense of who you
are and where you are headed? NO YES
8. d) Does your sense of who you are often change dramatically? NO YES
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8. e) Are you different with different people or in different situations
so that you sometimes don’t know who you really are? NO
8. f) Have there been lots of sudden changes in your goals, career
plans, religious beliefs, and so on? NO
8. g) Have you often done things impulsively? NO
8. h) Have you tried to hurt or kill yourself or threatened to do so? NO
8. i) Have you ever cut, burned, or scratched yourself on purpose? NO
8. j) Do you have a lot of sudden mood changes? NO
8. k) Do you often feel empty inside? NO
8. 1) Do you often have temper outbursts or get so angry that you
lose control? NO
8. m) Do you hit people or throw things when you get angry? NO
8. n) Do even little things get you very angry? NO
8. o) When you are under a lot of stress, do you get suspicious
of other people or feel especially spaced out? NO
AD/HD
1. Do you find that, more than most people, you tend to be forgetful 
and disorganized, you have trouble keeping track of things (like 
paperwork, bills, chores/tasks) and/or you are easily distracted 
and have trouble staying focused (i.e., on what someone is saying
or on a task or job)? (as for example/typical problems) NO
2. Do you find that, more than most people, you are overactive or 
restless when you are required to sit still or be quiet, you have 
trouble waiting your turn (i.e., in traffic, in line, in conversation), 
and/or you tend to be impatient with or interrupt others? (ask for 
example/typical problems) NO
3. Do these tendencies interfere with your ability to (a) do your job 
well and on time? (b) do your schoolwork well and on time? (c) 
perform household duties well and on time (i.e., pay bills, do
chores, organize schedules/appointments, for self/family)? NO
4. When did you first experience these tendencies? (i.e., any event 
you can remember that triggered these -  substance use, physical
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or psychological trauma or illness, sleep problems -  or have you
always been this way?) NO YES
That’s really all the questions I had to ask. It looks like:
1. Patient is included in the study:_____ you’d be a real good person to
have in the study.
2. Patient is excluded from the study:_____ unfortunately, you’re not the kind
of person we need in the study.
3. Uncertainty, call back:_____ I’m not quite sure if you’re exactly the fit we
need for the study. I’ll confer with my super­
visor and call you back within a day or so.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Impulsivity and Gambling 87
APPENDIX D 
Consent Form 
(on University of Windsor Letterhead)
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISINIHIBITION MECHANISMS
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: STEPHEN HIBBARD, PH.D.
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR 
(519) 253 -3000 ext. 2248
Purpose of the study. In this study, we are trying to look at different “mechanisms of 
disinhibition” in various people. Psychologists tend to study many of these “mechanisms” 
from different points of view. “Mechanisms of inhibition” just means how people stop 
themselves from doing things they don’t want to do. Mechanisms of ̂ inhibition means 
the ways in which some people have trouble stopping themselves. People who are 
disinhibited often have trouble in stopping themselves from doing things they might not 
really want to do or at least before they are ready. This study uses different lab 
assessment tasks to look into this in various people.
Procedures of the study. A) Tasks. You will be asked to do various lab tasks in this 
study. In two of these you will be asked to press a key on the computer keyboard when a 
certain signal comes up. In a third, you will learn which of different numbers are the ones 
that will give you a small monetary reward. In two others, you will judge whether certain 
figures on pieces of paper are the same (or similar) or not. You have a chance of winning 
a small amount of cash (less than $10.00). You have no risk of losing any money. B) 
Interview. There will also be some interview questions that the researchers will ask you. 
These questions are about emotional problems and diagnostic issues that you may or may 
not have. C) There will also be some personality and emotional problem questionnaires 
that you will answer. These are answered on computer.
Potential risks. There is nothing done to people physically in this study. There are no 
wires attached and nothing is put into anyone. No drugs will be administered. Some of 
the questions that are asked about emotional problems may bring up feelings in you that 
are scary, sad or otherwise uncomfortable for you if they remind you of your emotional 
difficulties.
Potential benefits. This is not a treatment study. Nobody is offering treatment in this 
study and no one is collecting information that might be used to help you later. So there is 
no direct benefit to you other than the compensation you will receive. Your participation 
in the lab tasks might be interesting to you because they are sort of like games. This study 
will likely be of benefit to researchers who try to understand the relationship of 
disinhibition to emotional problems.
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Payment. You will be remunerated $60.00 in either mall or grocery gift certificates for 
your participation. Your parking fees will also be paid to you and you may keep any 
money you earn in the lab tasks.
Confidentiality. The researchers who collect your data will keep your identity 
completely confidential, except in rare cases when they are ethically required to do 
otherwise. Data collected from you will be coded to an identification number that is not 
linked to your name in any way. Once you sign this form you are assigned this number 
and your name will never be connected to the data you give. The only place we will 
collect your name after you start the study is your signature on the receipt for 
compensation. This will never be linked with any data collected from you. There are a 
few situations in which researchers might be ethically required to break confidentiality. 
These include a credible indication of current suicidal or homicidal intent or the 
disclosure of child abuse. If you participate in the study, you give your consent for the 
researchers to break confidentiality in these instances.
Withdrawal from the study. You may withdraw from the study at any time with no 
further obligation. You will be paid on a pro rated basis for the amount of time you spent 
in the lab. That is, you will be paid for the fraction of the full 5 hour study time that you 
actually participated: time you spent in study/5 hours x $60.
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue without penalty. This 
study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University of 
Windsor Research Ethics Board. If you have problems regarding your rights as a 
research subject, contact:
Madeleine Mekis 
Research Ethics Co-ordinator 
University of Windsor 
Windsor, Ontario 
N9B3P4
I hereby acknowledge that I have read both sides of this consent form and I freely 
agree to participate in the study.




Copy of the consent: I have received a copy of this consent form to take with me. 
Initials
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APPENDIX E 
Full List of Measures in Disinhibition Study
1. Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. (1993) Beck Anxiety Inventory manual. San Antonio, TX: 
Psychological Corporation.
2. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI -  II)
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. (1993) Beck Depression Inventory manual. San Antonio, TX: 
Psychological Corporation.
3. Baratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS -  11)
Barratt, E. S. (2000). Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, Version 11 (BIS 11). In American 
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